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ABSTRACT 
In this study, the researcher compared student achievement in Florida charter schools by 
investigating differences in those managed by for profit and not-for-profit entities in all 
530 charter schools that reported results on the 2016 Florida Standards Assessments in 
Grades 4, 8, and 10 in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics.  Using a two-way 
analysis of covariance, this investigation found statistically significant achievement 
differences only in 10th-grade ELA when using poverty as a moderator variable and 
eighth-grade mathematics using both school cohort size and poverty as moderator 
variables.  Also, the covariates of percentage of minority students, percentage of disabled 
students, and percentage of English language learners accounted for some of the variance 
in achievement results.  These findings are similar to the extant literature where prior 
similar studies found mixed results between traditional public schools and charter schools 
and between not-for-profit and for-profit charter schools.  
Questions are raised by this research regarding the public funding of for-profit or 
proprietary charter schools if they do not routinely achieve superior results to traditional 
public schools.  Implications for future research both building on this study and 
investigating other aspects of charter school performance include conducting similar 
studies on a recurring basis to better evaluate charter school performance, closer study on 
the role the covariates (minority status, disability status, and English language learner 
status) has on charter school student achievement, and a comparison of Florida’s charter 
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Introduction and History 
School choice and charter schools have become major forces in education over 
the past 20 years (Kahlenberg& Potter, 2015).  After publication of A Nation at Risk by 
the National Commission on Excellence in Education in 1983, a movement to improve 
education began to take hold, ushering in the impetus for the charter school movement 
(Kolderie, 2005; Lockwood, 2004).  In 1988, Ray Budde wrote Education by Charter and 
sent copies to many people including Albert Shanker, who was serving as President of 
the American Federation of Teachers, a national teachers union affiliated with the AFL-
CIO (Liu, 2015; Nathan, 1996a).  Shanker saw possibility in the concept and proposed 
charter schools as a “new kind of public school…which would allow teachers to 
experiment with innovative approaches to educating students” (Kahlenberg & Potter, 
2015, p. 4).   
Budde saw the charter revolution taking over and replacing public school districts.  
In his vision, Budde envisioned charter schools run by teachers.  He presented his vision 
as a long scenario with a new superintendent addressing the school board and stating: 
The time has come for teachers, both individually and in what I call “charter 
teams” to accept full responsibility for the function of instruction.  I would do this 
by having teachers receive three-to-five-year mandates (and funds) for instruction 
directly from the school board – with no one between the teachers and the school 
board – not me as superintendent, nor your principal, nor a K-12 curriculum 
director. (p. 38) 
 
Shanker saw teacher unions as the major force in the new charter school concept.  
He envisioned union representatives serving on charter school governing boards, having 
teachers as members of the union, and including “a plan for faculty decision making” 
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(Khalenberg & Potter, 2015, p. 7).  He envisioned abolishing annual principal evaluations 
of teachers and replacing them with teaching teams that would utilize peer accountability 
(Khalenberg  & Potter, 2015). 
By 1989, Minnesota Senator Ember Reichgott crafted charter school legislation 
that found its way into the Minnesota Senate’s omnibus education bill, first in 1989 and 
again in 1990.  Both times, the Minnesota House of Representatives rejected the bill.  
Finally, in 1991, Minnesota Representatives Ken Nelson and Becky Kelso did get a 
compromise version of the legislation passed in the Minnesota House.  That compromise 
also passed the Senate and was signed into law by Minnesota’s governor, Arne Carlson 
(Kolderie, 2005). 
After Minnesota’s 1991 legislation, California followed suit in 1992.  In 1993, six 
additional states (Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, and 
Wisconsin) authorized charter schools.  Some states had models differing from 
Minnesota (Kolderie, 2005, Wong & Langevin, 2007).  Between 1993 and 2014, the 
number of states authorizing charter schools grew.  By 2015, all but seven states provided 
for charter schools.  The states that have not allowed them are Kentucky, Montana, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia (Liu, 2015). 
In 1994, the U. S. Congress passed the Federal Charter School Grant program that 
U. S. Senators Dave Durenberger of Minnesota and Joe Lieberman of Connecticut 
originally proposed in 1991.  The Clinton administration’s strong support of the charter 
school initiative prompted other states to draft and implement charter school legislation 
(Lockwood, 2004). 
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Florida adopted charter schools in 1996 (Wong & Langevin, 2007).  By 2003, 40 
states had implemented some form of charter school legislation (Wong & Langevin, 
2007).  In 2015, the federal Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) made provision for 
grants to states to foster funding and expansion of charter schools (Every Student 
Succeeds Act §4301 et.seq, 2015).  The Florida legislature specifically authorizes charter 
schools and stated, “Charter schools shall be part of the state’s program of public 
education. All charter schools in Florida are public schools” (Fla. Stat.,§ 1002.33, 
2015).While they do not always have the diversity of public schools, charter schools are 
often thought by the public to offer a “better” educational option (Crew & Anderson, 
2003; Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000; Finn, Manno, & Wright, 2016; Molnar, 2007). 
Every charter school in Florida is operated by a not-for-profit board.  That board can 
either operate the school themselves or engage a management company to operate the 
school.  Some operating companies are not-for-profit entities but others are for-profit 
entities. 
 For-profit Educational Management Organizations (EMO) are entities that are 
established to manage some charter schools and have as one of their primary goals, 
generating a profit for their shareholders.  In Florida, these for-profit EMOs operate 
under contract to the charter school’s not-for-profit governing board.  In the traditional 
public school, the incentive is to provide the best possible education to students. In the 
for-profit model, generating profit for shareholders becomes a (if not the) primary motive 
(Conn, 2002).  The more profit generated, the higher the return on investment. 
Not-for-profit charter school management models are run either by the not-for-
profit board that governs the charter school or by a not-for-profit management company.  
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The board itself oversees the management of the school and does not, therefore, pay an 
outside entity to provide management services.  This redirects the funds that would go 
toward profit in the for-profit model to other needs of the school, generally those that 
directly benefit students. 
Unlike traditional public schools, charter schools can, and at times do, cease 
operations.  They close their doors for a variety of reasons including but not limited to 
lower than expected student achievement or fiscal mismanagement.  These closures can 
be voluntary (at the discretion of the EMO) or mandatory (as ordered by the local school 
district or the state).  Should a mandatory closure occur, there is nothing to prevent the 
EMO from establishing a new entity and beginning the process again. Though in Florida, 
the local school district must approve each new charter school, any denial can be 
appealed to the State Board of Education, and that entity often orders the local district to 
grant the charter.   
EMOs in Florida have a financial incentive to keep opening new schools because 
subject to qualification, new charter schools in Florida can apply to receive a Public 
Education Capital Outlay (PECO) grant from the state after the first three years of its 
existence (Florida Statutes, 2015, §1013.62).  This means that after three years, charter 
school operators can apply to utilize state funds above and beyond the per-pupil monies 
they receive from the local school district to fund the costs of the real estate they occupy.  
Further, charter schools are not bound by the collective bargaining agreements of the 
local school district and can hire at any prevailing wage.  There is no provision in statute 
to prevent charter school operators from hiring family members or others, and though 
instructional staff must be certificated, the administrative staff has no such requirement 
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(Florida Statutes, 2015, §1002.33).  Theoretically, an unscrupulous individual or 
corporation could decide to open a charter school, pocket much of the money in the form 
of salaries and expenses, and close the school when the flow of money stops or the local 
district or the state withdraws the charter. 
Problem Statement 
With constant demands on limited school funds, it is essential for the public to be 
certain that education dollars are used solely in the best interest of students.  When for-
profit entities can tap into these funds even after failed experiences have resulted in 
closed charter schools under their management, a public policy question could arise to 
question whether allowing for-profit EMOs to operate in Florida is in the best interests of 
Floridians.  Because there has been little research conducted on Florida charter school 
student achievement, this research will add to the knowledge base. 
Purpose of the Study 
The results of this study are intended to help guide legislators and others in 
strengthening the charter school program to assure that public funds for education are 
spent on student educational needs and not on the profitability of unsuccessful for-profit 
EMOs. 
In this study, the research compared the academic performance of charter schools 
in Florida based on their management model (for-profit or not-for-profit) as measured by 
student achievement on the 2016 administration of the Florida Standards Assessment 
(FSA). In an effort to mitigate the influence of extraneous factors on the results of that 
comparison, the research design statistically controlled for variables including school 
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cohort size, school poverty status, student race, student disability, and English Language 
Learner status. 
Research Questions 
1. In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth-, eighth-, and 
tenth-grade state English Language Arts (reading) achievement measures vary 
between for-profit and not-for-profit charter schools in Florida? 
2. In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth- and eighth-
grade state mathematics achievement measures vary between for-profit and 
not-for-profit charter schools in Florida? 
Operational Definitions 
Disability status.  measured by the percentage of students reported disabled in 
each school on the Florida School Public Accountability Reports 2015-2016. 
English Language Learners.  measured by the percentage of students reported as 
English Language Learners in each school on the Florida School Public Accountability 
Reports 2015-2016. 
For-profit charter school.  a school operating under a charter from the state or a 
local school district that is managed by a for-profit corporation, excluding private schools 
as listed in the Florida Charter School Directory. 
Mathematics achievement. – measured by the mathematics mean scale scores on 
the 2016 administration of the FSA. 
Minority.  measured by the percentage of white students subtracted from 100 
percent as reported on the Florida School Public Accountability Reports, 2015-2016. 
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Not-for-profit charter school.  a school operating under a charter from the state or 
a local school district that is managed by a not-for-profit entity including groups such as 
the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) and excluding parochial or not-for-profit 
private schools, as listed in the Florida Charter School Directory. 
Poverty status.  measured by the percentage of free and reduced lunch eligible 
students in each school on the Florida School Public Accountability Reports 2015-2016. 
Reading achievement.  measured by the English Language Arts mean scale scores 
on the 2016 administration of the FSA. 
School cohort size.  measured by dividing the school enrollment by the number of 
grades in the school as reported in Florida School Public Accountability Reports 2015-
2016. 
Literature Review 
The literature investigating student achievement in charter schools across the 
United States is substantial,but the literature devoted solely to Florida charter schools is 
scant.  Most of the research conducted to date has focused on comparing student 
achievement in charter schools to student achievement in traditional public schools.  That 
research has shown mixed results.  There have only been a few studies (Garcia, Barber, & 
Molnar, 2009; Molnar, 2001; Petrerson & Chingos, 2009; Toson, 2011) comparing the 
student achievement of students attending not-for-profit charter schools with those 
attending for-profit charter schools. 
The anticipation of superior student performance for charter school students as 
compared to traditional public school students was one of the reasons charter schools 
were established (Crew & Anderson, 2003).  Also, advocates of charter schools 
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postulated that charter schools would force traditional public schools to improve because 
of the competition that charter schools provide (Crew & Anderson, 2003).  The authors 
concluded that there is no advantage to charter schools over traditional public schools 
based on student performance, and that there is no competitive reason for traditional 
public schools to follow charter school practices.   
Zimmer, Gill, Booker, Lavertu, and Witte (2012) examined charter schools in 
Chicago, Denver, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, San Diego, Ohio, and Texas.  Controlling for 
student differences in demographics and special needs, they found no significant 
differences between students attending charter schools and traditional public schools  
(Zimmer et al., 2012).  In some cases, (Chicago and Texas) they found that there were 
advantages to students in traditional public schools.  In Denver, however, they found 
charter school students achieving at higher levels than students in traditional public 
schools (Zimmer et al., 2012).  They attributed some of the differences to missing data 
(an external validity issue) and stated that “Researchers need to be explicit about their 
assumptions when examining charter schools, or any other intervention” (Zimmer et al., 
2012, p. 221).   
Sass (2006) found that in Florida, during the first years of a charter school’s 
operation, student achievement was lower than it was in traditional public schools.  By 
the fifth year, the disparity in reading achievement between charter schools and 
traditional public schools was eliminated, and mathematics scores exceeded those of 
traditional public schools.  As charter schools were more closely compared, those that 
targeted at-risk or special needs populations showed lower student achievement 
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compared to traditional public schools.  Also, no difference was found between for-profit 
and not-for-profit charter schools (Sass, 2006). 
In an Arizona study, Garcia, Barber, and Molnar (2009) found that charter schools 
had no consistent advantage over traditional public schools.  The only exception was for 
students who attended either a charter school or a traditional public school (but not 
necessarily the same school) for three consecutive years.  Those students attending not-
for-profit charter schools showed a higher total mathematics score (Garcia et al., 2009).  
In analyzing the achievement of students attending the same school for three consecutive 
years, the authors found both for-profit and not-for-profit charter schools showed 
advantages in basic skills over traditional public schools while complex thinking skills 
showed some negative effects. 
When analyzing reasons why charter schools closed in North Carolina from 1996-
2005, Paino, Renzulli, Boylan, and Bradley (2014) found that 62.50% of closures were 
due to financial reasons followed by 29.17% for mismanagement.  The authors 
emphasized that though charter schools close for financial reasons, most of those closed 
were also underperforming in academics when compared to other charter schools.  The 
authors acknowledged that their findings were limited to North Carolina.  Therefore, they 
advocated for additional research to “move toward a more complete understanding of 
how charter schools are keeping the promises of accountability in the school choice 
movement.…” (Paino et al., 2014, p. 531). 
The research cited shows there have been no definitive findings that support the 
assertion that charter schools lead to increased student achievement.  There has not been 
much research into for-profit charter school student achievement as compared to not-for-
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profit charter school student achievement.  The current research study was initiate to fill a 
gap in this area, add to the knowledge base, and increase the understanding of charter 
school student achievement in Florida. 
Methodology 
Research Design 
The researcher employed a causal comparative design to investigate the possible 
influence of the school management model on reading and mathematics achievement 
among charter school students.  The causal comparative design investigates differences 
between groups and attempts to explain those differences by examining the independent 
variable, in this case, the charter school management model (Fraenkel, Wallen, & Hyun, 
2015).  Including the moderators of school cohort size and school poverty, and the 
covariates of minority status, student disability, and student English Language Learner, 
percentages in the study gave a clearer picture of the influence of the school management 
model on student achievement by filtering out other likely influences.  School cohort 
size, school poverty factors, and minority percentages have been shown in prior research 
to have an effect on student achievement (Egalite & Kisida, 2016; Johnson, Godwyll, & 
Shope, 2016; Lee & Loeb, 2000; Murphy, 2010; White et al., 2016). 
Participants 
The participants in this research included every charter school in Florida that 
tested its students using the 2016 Florida Standards Assessment (FSA).  This comprised 
the census of reporting charter schools in the state.  Thus, in sharp contrast to most 
empirical research, the data set included the entire population of interest, and there was 
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then no need to make inferences from a sample to the larger population. Relationships 
that differ from zero are by definition real. Measures of statistical significance are, 
strictly speaking, unnecessary.  Nevertheless, statistical significance is reported and 
treated as a marker for practical significance (Bickel, 2007). 
Instrumentation and Data Collection 
Data were retrieved from the publicly available Florida Department of Education 
website.  Charter school annual reports, also available on the Florida Department of 
Education website, were reviewed to determine the management model (for-profit or not-
for-profit) that each school employed.  Each charter school was categorized by its 
management model.  The data from the state reports were entered into a single 
spreadsheet to enable analysis using the Statistics Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to 
analyze the data. 
Variables 
The study had two research questions, comparing student achievement in English 
Language Arts (ELA) and student achievement in mathematics according to the 
management model of the school.  The student-weighted mean scale scores for English 
Language Arts and mathematics for each charter school were utilized as the dependent 
variables in the analysis to determine if one management model was superior to the other. 
The independent variable in this study was the charter school management model 
(for-profit or not-for-profit).  The management model of each charter school was 
identified as either not-for-profit or for-profit and was used to compare student 
achievement results. 
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Covariates and moderator variables were included in the study to control for their 
influence on student achievement and to investigate the possibility of interaction effects 
influencing student achievement.  Each school’s cohort enrollment (expressed as the total 
school enrollment divided by the number of grades in the school) and poverty level 
(expressed as the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch), were the 
moderator variables.  Each school’s minority status (expressed as the percentage of 
minority students), disabled students status (expressed as the percentage of students with 
disabilities), and English Language Learners status (expressed as the percentage of 
English Language Learners) were factored in as covariate variables. 
Measurement of Variables 
Each year the Florida Department of Education publishes individual school results 
including mean scale scores for each test of the FSA.  Those results are available on the 
Florida Department of Education’s website for download by members of the public.   
Scores for some charter schools are not reported in accordance with Florida 
Department of Education policy: “For all grades and subjects, no data were reported if 
fewer than ten students were tested.  Additionally, for grade 10 ELA, Algebra 1, and 
Geometry no data were reported if all students passed or if all students failed” (Florida 
Department of Education, 2016a, p. 20).  
The data for this study consisted of student achievement data from the 2016 
administration of the FSA in English Language Arts at Grades 4, 8, and 10, and in 
mathematics at Grades 4 and 8 for all charter schools reporting for 2015-2016.  Student 
achievement was measured by the mean scale score for each school.  The management 
model of each charter school that operated in the state during the 2015-2016 academic 
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year was determined by reviewing records available from the Florida Department of 
Education.  Reliability and validity data for the 2016 FSA from the Florida Department 
of Education were reviewed (Florida Department of Education, 2016b).  Demographic 
data from the Florida Department of Education including school enrollment and number 
of grades, poverty, minority status, percentage of students with disabilities, and English 
Language Learners (ELL) were used as moderator variables and covariates (Florida 
Department of Education, 2016c). 
Data Analysis 
For each group of charter schools (i.e., not-for-profit and for-profit), the mean and 
the standard deviations for the dependent and independent variables were calculated and 
presented as descriptive statistics.  The two groups were then compared using a two-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) using school cohort size and poverty status as 
moderator variables and percentage of minority students, percentage of students with 
disabilities, and percentage of students who were English language learners as covariates. 
Through the ANCOVA, the null hypotheses that there was no difference between student 
achievement in for-profit and not-for-profit charter schools was tested for statistical 
significance.  Significant results were reported as a marker for practical significance, 
because the use of the full population meant there was no need to generalize from a 
sample.  As noted, the use of ANCOVA as opposed to ANOVA allowed the analysis to 
control for the influence of relevant school characteristics and to investigate the 
possibility of interaction influences; its use enhances the researcher’s ability to detect 
differences that are attributable to the management model.  To determine the power of the 
results, a partial Eta squared was calculated as a measure of effect size to determine if the 
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differences, if any, were small, moderate, or large.  Tabachnick & Fidell (1989) defined 
partial Eta squared differences as small if .01-.089; medium as .09 to .249; and large as 
.25 or more. 
Delimitations 
This study design included the following delimitations: 
1. This study was conducted to investigate charter schools in Florida. 
2. Student achievement was measured by the mean scale scores on the 2016 
administration of the English Language Arts and mathematics FSA.   
Limitations 
This study design included the following limitations: 
1. Because the study was delimited to charter schools in Florida, results are 
not immediately generalizable to other states. 
2. Because scores used to measure academic performance were limited to 
English Language Arts and mathematics, the results are not necessarily 
representative of the overall academic performance of charter schools. 
3. Only charter schools reporting FSA results in 2016 were included in the 
study.  The schools not included were those that were exempt from 
reporting by law or regulation.  Because these charter schools’ results 
were missing, their student achievement was not included in the 
calculations.  This may have affected the study outcome. 
4. Not every charter school had identical resources.  There were differences 
between schools in materials, student-teacher ratios, teacher experience 
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levels, educational philosophy, and per-pupil expenditures.  These factors, 
although not readily available, may have affected the results of the study. 
5. Differing testing conditions among the charter schools may have had an 
undue influence on the results.  Some of the schools utilized computer 
testing, and in some locations technical problems arose.  Other local 
occurrences such as noise outside of the testing environment, unexpected 
interruptions to the testing room or similar events may have occurred and 
affected test results.  Such interferences in the testing process were not 
readily available. 
Organization of the Study 
The report of the research has been divided into five chapters.  This first chapter is 
the introduction to the topic and established the importance of the study including a brief 
charter school history, a review of the gaps in the extant literature, and an overview of the 
methodology used to examine and analyze the data.  The limitations and delimitations of 
the study were also presented. 
Chapter 2 consists of an exhaustive review of the extant literature on charter 
schools. Chapter 3 details the methodology used in the study.  Chapters 4 and 5 report 
and discuss the results of the research, offering suggestions for future research. 
Summary 
Chapter 1 set forth the premise and the justification for the study of the influence 
on student achievement in Florida of charter school management models (for-profit or 
not-for-profit).  The chapter began with an introduction to the charter school movement, 
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its legal beginnings in Minnesota, and its spread across the United States including 
Florida, where enabling legislation was passed in 1996.  A brief review of the differing 
management models was presented culminating in the study’s problem statement, raising 
the public policy question of determining if for-profit charter schools are in the public 
interest.  The study’s research questions were presented along with the operational 
definitions used in this research.  A brief review of the extant literature followed with the 
observation that there has been little research on this topic to date and that this study will 
help fill some of the gaps in the literature.  The methodology for the study was presented, 
including the study’s limitations and delimitations.  The chapter concluded with an 






Charter schools have proliferated in Florida since they were authorized by statute 
in 1996.  All Florida charter schools are governed by a not-for-profit board and may 
contract with an educational management company to provide management services for 
the school.  Some of these management companies are not-for profit entities but others 
are for-profit corporations.   
The literature search for this dissertation was conducted using multiple Ebsco 
databases.  The search began with the researcher targeting the terms “charter schools” 
and “achievement.”  This search yielded 1,180 results.  To narrow the search, the terms 
were refined to charter schools, achievement, and profit.  This search yielded 174 results.  
The search was then rerun, substituting the term, nonprofit instead of the term, profit, 
which yielded 139 results, some of which were duplicates from the profit search. 
Because this dissertation focused on Florida charter schools, the search was run  
three more times.  The first of these reruns used the terms, charter school, nonprofit, and 
Florida.  This yielded five results.  When the term, nonprofit, was changed to profit, the 
search yielded seven results.  Finally, the search was rerun the third time, using the terms 
charter school, achievement or state standards, and Florida.  This search yielded 58 
returns.  
The literature search showed that little, if any, research had been conducted to 
study the differences between those charter schools managed by not-for profit 
management companies and those managed by for-profit management companies, an 
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important consideration given the differing and potentially competing objectives of the 
two types of organizations.   
This chapter reviews the existing literature on charter schools including their 
historical beginnings, their growth nationwide and in Florida, the charter school enabling 
legislation in Florida, and a description of charter school management models.  Also 
included is a review of research that addresses student achievement in charter schools as 
compared to traditional public schools and between charter schools with different 
management models.  The history of charter schools is explained beginning with the 
prime motivator of the school choice movement, the publication of A Nation at Risk in 
1983 by the National Commission on Excellence in Education and by the accountability 
movement as required in the No Child Left Behind legislation.  The early charter school 
concept is explored, including the rationale, expectations, and promises of the charter 
school movement, the first charter school legislation in Minnesota in 1992, and the 
subsequent growth of charter schools nationwide. 
The chapter continues by examining the development of charter schools in Florida 
beginning with the 1996 authorizing legislation.  Discussed is how the enabling 
legislation has changed since its first passage and morphed into the charter schools in 
present day Florida. 
Next, the chapter focuses on charter school management models, both not-for-
profit and for-profit.  The literature on proprietary charter schools is reviewed, including 
the concerns they engender. 
Finally, research on student achievement in charter schools is reviewed.  How 
well traditional public schools compare with charter schools both nationwide and in 
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Florida is discussed, concluding with an examination of the research on how student 
achievement in Florida’s not-for-profit charter schools compares with student 
achievement in its for-profit charter schools. 
The Accountability Movement 
A Nation at Risk 
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education published its 
landmark report to the U. S. Department of Education (USDOE) entitled, A Nation at 
Risk.  The commission, created by U.S. Secretary of Education Terrence Bell on August 
26, 1981, was composed of 18 educators (or education-minded political figures).  The 
commission was charged “to examine the quality of education in the United States” 
(National Commission, 1983, p. 1).   
In their introduction to the report, the authors wrote: 
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre 
educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act 
of war.  As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves.  We have even 
squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik 
challenge.  Moreover, we have dismantled essential support systems which helped 
make those gains possible.  We have, in effect, been committing an act of 
unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament. (National Commission, 1983, p. 
5) 
 
The report was concerned that, as a result of the decline of student performance in 
the nation’s schools, as measured by a series of 13 indicators, America would cede its 
place as a world leader in business, industry, and other areas of venture.  The authors 
stated the concern that the inherent promise made to all Americans, the assurance that 
“All, regardless of race or class or economic status, are entitled to a fair chance and to the 
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tools for developing their individual powers of mind and spirit to the utmost” (National 
Commission, 1983, p. 8) would not be fulfilled. 
To rescue America from this potential devastating fate, the commission examined 
the educational system in four major areas:  content, expectations, time, and teaching.  
They found issues nationwide in each area.  In the content area, they found little rigor in 
the curriculum with few students taking courses such as intermediate algebra, calculus, 
and foreign languages.  They found expectations lacking with minimal competency 
examinations predominating because “… the ‘minimum’ … become[s] the ‘maximum,’ 
thus lowering educational standard for all” (National Commission, 1983, p. 20).  They 
also found fault with those policies that require state universities to accept any high 
school graduate, enabling students to take weak high school courses because college 
entry was guaranteed.  Regarding time, the commission found that the average time 
students spent in school was 22 hours per week, and that driver education and cooking 
classes counted as much toward graduation as mathematics and the sciences.  Finally, 
with regard to teachers, they found that many teachers were unprepared to teach, and that 
teacher education had too many teaching methods courses as compared to subject matter 
courses (National Commission, 1983).   
As a result of their findings, the commission made a series of recommendations to 
alleviate the risk and to return the country to the path of educational superiority.  These 
recommendations addressed the four risk areas, outlining commission concerns and 
adding a fifth area, leadership, and fiscal support.  In the content area, the commission 
recommended a more rigorous sequence of courses with mandatory completion including 
intensive study in English, mathematics, science, social studies, and computer science.  In 
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the area of expectations, it recommended rigorous and measurable standards to be certain 
students had the necessary credentials for an advanced education.  In discussing time, the 
commission recommended a longer school day and instructional year including “7-hour 
school days as well as a 200- to 220-day school year” (National Commission, 1983, p. 
29).  Regarding teaching, better salaries, a longer work-year, and more stringent 
requirements for teacher education programs were recommended.  For leadership and 
fiscal support, they reiterated the states’ primary responsibility to provide for education 
while reserving for the federal government the “primary responsibility to identify the 
national interest in education” (p. 33) and assure leadership to be certain that resources 
are available to address these concerns (National Commission, 1983). 
As a direct result of the accountability recommendations in A Nation at Risk, a 
movement developed to create standards-based education, including the creation of 
mechanisms to evaluate student achievement.  These mechanisms included both 
sanctions and incentives for schools and school districts that were tied to student 
achievement (Berends, 2004).   
Ravitch (2008) opined that “The recommendations of A Nation at Risk remain 
unrealized today … because the message was taken over by the testing and accountability 
posse” (last para.).  Regardless of whether A Nation at Risk stressed the need for more 
accountability in the schools or whether, as Ravitch (2008) stated, her message was 
hijacked by those advocating testing and accountability, the report ultimately brought the 
issue of school accountability to the fore. 
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No Child Left Behind 
School choice options, including charter schools, became a hotly debated topic 
following A Nation at Risk.  There were attempts to initiate standards-based school 
reform, especially by Marshall Smith, an Undersecretary of Education from 1993 through 
2000 (Berends, 2004; Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2017; 
USDOE, n.d.).  Both the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 and the Goals 2000: 
Educate America Act set forth mechanisms for schools to develop standards that would 
enable assessment of student achievement in a significant manner (Berends, 2004; 
Congressional Digest, 1997; USDOE, 1995).There were many concerns about these 
federal mandates that were expressed by educators and policymakers.  Accordingly, the 
Goals 2000 legislation included provisions clarifying that state participation was 
voluntary, and there was no requirement mandating approval of standards by the federal 
government for a state to receive federal funding under the act (Congressional Digest, 
1997). 
By 1999, the time Goals 2000 was set for reauthorization, its voluntary student 
assessment provisions came under fire from many politicians who wanted to see rigorous 
assessment required of all students.  Ultimately, Goals 2000 was allowed to drop by the 
106th Congress (Vinovskis, 2009). 
Some saw Goals 2000 as an attempt by the federal government to have greater 
control over educational policy (Radu, 2012; Vinovskis, 2009).  Although many 
Democrats supported these federal mandates, the Republicans wanted those decisions left 
in the hands of the state and demurred during the Clinton administration.  With the 
election of George W. Bush in 2000, that position changed (Vinovskis, 2009). 
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With the enactment of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation in 2002, the 
federal government required states to be accountable not only for Title I funded programs 
but for the major parts of the curriculum for all students, including reading and 
mathematics.  NCLB, a controversial piece of legislation, contained “a number of 
measures designed to drive broad gains in student achievement and to hold states and 
schools more accountable for student progress” (Editorial Projects, 2011, p. 1).  The law 
required annual testing of students in Grades 3-8 in reading and mathematics by the 
2005-06 school year.  By the 2013-14 school year, schools were required to have all 
students at the “proficient” level on tests to be determined by the individual states.  There 
were penalties and remedial requirements for schools with Title I programs that failed to 
meet proficiency levels.   
Beginning in 2002-03 schools were required to report to the public information 
relating to their students’ academic achievement.  Other provisions of the act addressed 
teacher qualifications.  Also, a new grant program entitled Reading First designed to 
assist states and districts in establishing research-based reading programs for students in 
Grades K-3 was introduced.  Additionally, the act required that adequate yearly progress 
be defined as applying to all students in the state, not just those in Title I programs 
(Editorial Project, 2011; Finn, 2008; No Child Left Behind Act of 2001; USDOE, 2002). 
The success of NCLB in improving student proficiency was often debated by 
educators.  Some pointed to the improvement in scores on the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP), a standardized test administered in school districts 
nationwide, as proof that NCLB was working.  Others argued that though there were 
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overall improvements in test scores, the proficiency level was not improving.  Vinovskis 
(2009), citing other sources, stated: 
Overall, fewer than a third of students in those grades [grades 4 and 8] were 
considered proficient in math or reading, making it even more unlikely that the 
goal of all children being proficient, in terms of national NAEP standards, by 
2013-2014 would be met (p. 197). 
 
There were a number of empirical studies on the effects of the NCLB legislation 
and student achievement.  In reviewing these studies, Husband and Hunt (2015) 
concluded that though there was much hope for student achievement gains when the 
legislation was passed, research findings between 2001 and 2010 indicated that the law 
was generally not successful in fulfilling its objectives.  There were mixed results in 
linking the law to student gains and many researchers detailed unintended negative 
consequences for the legislation.  Husband and Hunt stated, “Furthermore, a significant 
number of schools and school districts were labeled as failures during the ten-year period 
of time emphasized in our review” (p. 240). 
Another analysis of NCLB on student achievement indicated that in 2004 there 
was some correlation between mathematics achievement among fourth- and eighth-grade 
students and high-stakes testing results.  In later testing, 2005-2009, those positive results 
turned into negative results.  When compared with the NAEP, however, those results in 
mathematics disappeared, and some positive correlation developed in reading.  The 
authors concluded that “under pressure, teachers grow more efficient at training students 
for the test” (Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2012, p. 27).  They also stated that much 
research on the impact of testing, low-stakes testing as well as high-stakes testing, 
indicated that testing had little, if any, effect on student achievement (Nichols et al., 
2012).  
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The NCLB legislation also encouraged school choice to include charter schools.  
Section 5201 of the Act setting forth the purposes of the section read: 
It is the purpose of this subpart to increase national understanding of the charter 
schools model by— 
(1) providing financial assistance for the planning, program design, and initial 
implementation of charter schools; 
(2) evaluating the effects of such schools, including the effects on students, 
student academic achievement, staff, and parents; 
(3) expanding the number of high-quality charter schools available to students 
across the Nation; and 
(4) encouraging the States to provide support to charter schools for facilities 
financing in an amount more nearly commensurate to the amount the States have 
typically provided for traditional public schools. (No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, §5201) 
 
Despite the fact that charter schools have generally been considered to be public 
schools, and although they have been exempt from many requirements imposed on 
traditional public schools, charter schools have remained obligated to demonstrate 
student achievement outcomes on the same measures used by every other public school.  
This requirement by NCLB was in place despite the charter schools’ accountability 
requirements that were imposed by their charters (Stillings, 2005). 
The results of the impact of the requirement on charter schools to demonstrate 
student achievement outcomes with the same testing instruments used by traditional 
public schools is clearly indicated when examining the results of charter schools with one 
set of goals that are impeded because the school fails to make adequate yearly progress as 
mandated by NCLB.  A case in point was the Washington, DC Bilingual Community 
Academy, a now-closed charter school, whose purpose was to provide Spanish-English 
bilingual education in an immersion program.  The school served minorities (it had only 
African-American and Latino students over its three-year lifespan) and closed in 2009 
because of low enrollment and financial concerns (Martin, 2015).  Although student 
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scores were extremely low on the required assessment measure (the DC Comprehensive 
Assessment System), they showed marked improvement on the school’s internal 
assessment system.  This indicated that students were making progress toward 
proficiency on the school’s measure but not on the high-stakes required testing.  As a 
result, the school was forced to redirect from its goal of bilingual excellence to an 
emphasis on grade-level focused education.  It was also required to now focus on test 
preparation.  Ultimately, the school's focus was changed, and many other cultural and 
non-academic services including community-building activities were either curtailed or 
eliminated.  This ultimately changed the character of the school and contributed to its 
ultimate closure (Martin, 2015). 
In a 10-state study of charter school test scores between 1999 and 2001, Loveless 
(2003) found that achievement of students in charter schools fell below the achievement 
of students in traditional public schools by one-quarter of a standard deviation when 
those scores were adjusted for the students’ racial and socioeconomic status.  
Interestingly, over the same period charter schools and traditional public schools 
improved at a comparable rate.  Also, new charters scored lower for the first two years of 
their operation, and after the third year of operation met the scores of older charter 
schools (Loveless, 2003). 
Miron & Nelson (2001) looked at student achievement in charter schools and 
found that in some instances there was a positive impact, in some a negative impact, and 
in still others both positive and negative impacts.  They concluded that charter schools 
did not appear to impact student achievement consistently. 
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Charter School Development 
Conceptual History 
The call for school reform rang loudly in the early 1990s as schools came under 
intense scrutiny to improve educational outcomes.  Most public schools at the time, and 
at present, were based on the age-grade system.  Age-grading was developed by William 
T. Harris who, from 1868-1880 served as superintendent of the St. Louis, Missouri public 
schools and later, from 1889 to 1906, as the United States Commissioner of Education.  
His system “was the graded school, organized by years and quarters of years of work, 
with pupils moving through on the basis of regular and frequent examinations” (Levine & 
Levine, 2012, p. 457). 
This system of education was based on the factory models of the industrial era 
that, in the early 20th century, adopted the scientific management concept devised by 
Frederick Taylor.  The idea was to systematize how public education was delivered by 
standardizing many aspects of the process.  Part of the motivation of this approach was to 
accommodate the influx of students in schools as a result of compulsory education laws.  
One result of this system was the state strengthening its grip on education by regulating 
teacher certification and setting high school graduation requirements.  In some circles, it 
came to be known as the “one best system” (Finn et al., 2000, p. 54; Finn et al., 2016; 
Levine & Levine, 2012). 
By 1960, noted economist Milton Friedman began advocating for the end of 
government-operated schools.  He urged the government to provide a voucher to each 
family, in an amount equal to the cost of providing education, which could be used at the 
school of their choice, provided that the state approved the school.  He envisioned 
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competitive schools trying to attract students based on the quality of the education they 
would provide.  Thus, he saw market forces driving school improvement and creating 
better schools (Finn et al., 2016, 2000). 
Concurrent with the discussions on privatizing education, others began speaking 
about generating equality in educational resource distribution to provide better 
opportunities for learning for students.  The 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act was marked by its desire to equalize educational opportunity for disadvantaged 
students (Finn et al., 2000). 
James Coleman was a pioneer in discussing school inequality.  In 1966, he 
completed writing a report for the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
where he found that there was no relationship between the amount of money schools 
spent on programs or other inputs into the educational enterprise and improved student 
achievement (Coleman, 1966; Finn et al., 2000). 
Building on Coleman, Carroll (1966) emphasized the need to accommodate the 
individual needs of students rather than maintaining a one-size-fits-all model of public 
schools.  In most schools, time and activities are fixed by the institution.  He advocated 
for enabling students to learn at their own pace (Finn et al., 2000).  He concluded, “One 
of the bolder hypotheses implicit in the model is that the degree of learning, other things 
being equal, is a simple function of the amount of time during which the pupil engages 
actively in learning” (Carroll, 1964, p. 732). 
Another call for school choice, primarily in the form of vouchers, was sounded by 
Jencks (1966).  He identified two major issues as obstacles to student gains in the urban 
areas of New York City:  money and the bureaucracy of the established educational 
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enterprise.  Realizing that changes were not likely to occur, Jencks advocated giving 
parents the funds so they could seek the educational environment of their choice for their 
children.  He wrote, “If, for example, the poor were simply given the money that is now 
spent on their children’s education in public schools, and were told they could spend this 
money in private institutions, private schools would begin to spring up to serve slum 
children” (Jencks, 1966, p. 24). 
Throughout the following years, there was discussion on school improvement, but 
little happened until the publication of A Nation at Risk when voices calling for change 
reached a crescendo.  School choice advocates clamored for changes and suggested 
various models for improving student achievement and closing the equality gap.  These 
included voucher systems, magnet schools, and alternative schools (Chubb & Moe, 
1990). 
Many school choice proponents advocated opening all public schools to all 
children, regardless of attendance or zoning areas.  Districts would be required to provide 
information to each parent on the different school offerings in the district as well as 
employing personnel to assist parents in making appropriate school choices for their 
children.  Chubb and Moe (1900) offered a recommendation to fundamentally change 
public schools into a choice system that would eliminate the bureaucratic structure that 
operated and controlled public schools. Most of those who previously held authority over 
the schools would have their authority permanently withdrawn, and that authority would 
be vested in schools, parents, and students.  Schools would be legally autonomous:  
Free to govern themselves as they want, specify their own goals and programs and 
methods, design their own organizations, select their own student bodies, and 
make their own personnel decisions.  Parents and student would be legally 
empowered to choose among alternative schools, aided by institutions designed to 
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promote active involvement, well-informed decisions, and fair treatment. (Chubb 
& Moe, 1990, p. 226) 
Rationale, Expectations, and Promises 
When charter schools were proposed, their advocates had many dreams for the 
influence they would exert on the educational marketplace, including traditional public 
schools.  Among the expectations for charters was the development of specialized 
schools to offer curricula not available or not stressed in the traditional school, and 
empowering parents and educators to operate the school. Advocates thought that better 
achievement results might emerge as more options including innovative approaches were 
created for students, and traditional public schools would be encouraged to meet the 
higher educational accomplishments of charter schools (Crew & Anderson, 2003; Finn et 
al., 2000, 2016). 
In reality, these promises or hoped-for accomplishments have often faded into 
darkness.  One of the larger and best-known not-for-profit charter school alliances is 
known as Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) and currently operates 200 schools in 31 
regions (KIPP Foundation, n.d.).  KIPP imposed restrictions and demands on its students 
and staff, leading to high attrition rates among both groups of people (Payne & Knowles, 
2009).  Not only has there been attrition, but there have also been other concerns.  “We 
see little evidence substantiating the early hopes that charters would, through healthy 
competition, spur improvements in traditional districts” (Payne & Knowles, 2009, p. 
232).  Often charter schools are in competition with traditional schools to the extent that 
communication falters.  Each side, charters and traditional schools, are focused on 
defeating the other and, consequently, the schools do not learn from each other (Payne & 
Knowles, 2009). 
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Another early promise of charter schools was that by relieving the charter school 
from many of the mandated requirements of traditional public schools, teacher autonomy 
would be enhanced and teachers would have the freedom to teach (Nathan, 1996b).  This 
would enable teachers to innovate and be more resourceful with their students.  Some 
researchers have shown that in some instances teachers do not believe they have more 
autonomy than their traditional public school colleagues; others have indicated they have 
no more autonomy than their peers (Oberfield, 2016).  Finn et al. (2000), however, found 
that teachers do feel they have more autonomy in curricular matters as well as in school 
leadership (Finn et al., 2000). 
One major impediment to the independence of charter schools has been the 
attitude of teacher unions.  Teacher unions offered fierce opposition to charter school 
legislation fearing that it would abrogate their contracts, entice lower pay for teachers, 
and hold teachers more accountable for student achievement (Nathan, 1996b).  Teacher 
unions, however, have generally been unable to sway state legislatures to weaken charter 
schools.  “Organizations such as the NEA and AFT failed to frame the charter school 
debate to their advantage and in many states missed the opportunity to maintain control 
over this aspect of education policy” (Giersch, 2014, p. 667). 
Minnesota 
Minnesota, which would soon become the first state to authorize charter schools, 
developed its program of school choice on the premise that public education should not 
be limited to government-operated schools but should be open to other options 
(Schroeder, 2004).  In 1988 the Citizens League produced a report encouraging school 
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choice for all children.  The authors, building on the prior work of Budde and Shanker, 
stated: 
Our best prospects for better quality--and real progress toward integration--lie in a 
policy environment that permits first, teachers and parents to participate in the 
management of their schools, and second, the creation of new, high quality 
schools in the parts of the community most likely to serve disadvantaged 
populations. (Rollwagen & McClellan, 1988, p. 3) 
 
Budde and Shanker strove to create a school operated solely by teachers 
responsible only to the school board, and without oversight from either building- or 
district-level administrators (Budde, 1988; Finn et al., 2000; Khalenberg & Potter, 2015). 
The Minnesota initiative to pass charter school legislation took four years to 
become law.  Starting in 1989, legislation was filed to permit charter schools but did not 
muster sufficient votes be enacted.  In 1991, a compromise bill was passed that granted 
freedom to charters from state regulations and statutes, affording each charter school 
status as a school district onto its own with the ability to hire and manage its own funds 
that were to flow directly from the state to the school.  The compromise, however, limited 
charter schools to eight in the state, provided that only school districts could grant 
charters, and required the governing board of each charter to have a majority membership 
of certificated teachers who were employees of the school (Schroeder, 2004). 
The first Minnesota charter school to open was St. Paul’s City Academy which 
began operation in the fall of 1992.  By 1993, responding to public interest and existing 
school district opposition to the charter schools, the Minnesota Legislature authorized the 
State Board of Education to hear appeals and grant charters for applicants who were not 
approved at the local level provided at least two local school board members supported 
the application.  Also, they raised the number of available charters from eight to 20 and 
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allowed conversion of existing schools to charters with the agreement of 90% of the 
school’s teaching staff (Schroeder, 2008). 
Over the ensuing years, additional changes were made to the law.  In 1997, the 
charter school cap was removed, allowing for an unlimited number of charter schools to 
operate.  Additional charter school sponsors were authorized to include both public and 
private colleges and universities, intermediate school districts, and large not-for-profit 
organizations and foundations.  Funding was added to charters including transportation, 
facility funding, extra funding for students living in poverty, assistance with charter 
school leasing expenses, and certain other voter-approved funding initiatives.  Finally, 
conversion schools were authorized with 60% teacher approval instead of the initial 90% 
requirement, and a state waiver provision for the charter school governing body’s 
certificated teacher requirement (Schroeder, 2004).  At the time of the present study, 164 
charter schools operated in Minnesota serving approximately 57,000 students in Grades 
K-12 (Minnesota Department of Education, 2017). 
Growth Nationwide 
Following Minnesota’s implementation of charter schools in 1991, expansion 
across the United States was rapid.  California followed on the heels of Minnesota in 
1992.  During 1993, adoption of charter school legislation was passed in Colorado, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, and Wisconsin.  Arizona, Hawaii, and 
Kansas joined the movement in 1994, and Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming joined in 1995.  
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina became charter school states (and territories) in 1996.  Nevada, Ohio, and 
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Pennsylvania joined in 1997, and Missouri, New York, Utah, and Virginia joined in 
1998.  Oklahoma and Oregon passed legislation for charter schools in 1999 with Indiana 
following in 2001, Iowa, and Tennessee in 2002, and Maryland in 2003.  The last states 
to join the movement were Mississippi in 2010, Maine in 2011, Alabama in 2015, and 
Washington in 2016.  Although Alabama, Mississippi, and Washington have charter 
school laws, they do not have any operating charter schools.  Finally, seven states have 
no provision for charter schools.  They are Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia (Finn et al., 2016; Liu, 2015; National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2016). 
The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools is a Washington, DC-based 
organization that advocates for public charter schools.  The organization has conducted 
research and collected data on charter schools nationwide.  According to its website, 
between 1999 and 2014, the number of students attending charter schools grew from 
349,714 to 2,686,166, and the number of charter schools grew from 1,542 to 6,633 
(National Alliance, 2017).  Since 2007, the number of students attending charter schools 
has increased, and the number of students attending traditional public schools has 
decreased (Finn et al., 2016).  More than 50% of the nearly three million students 
attending charter schools are in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and Texas (Finn 
et al., 2016). 
Charter schools are not monolithic—they do not all look alike.  Some schools are 
general in nature, much like the traditional public school.  Others may specialize in a 
particular approach or focus.  For example, there are Montessori schools that utilize that 
particular educational philosophy.  There are STEM schools that emphasize science, 
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technology, and mathematics.  There are charter schools that specialize in the arts; others 
have an international focus, and still others are single-sex or emphasize the classics.  
Some schools are brick and mortar, and others are virtual.  Needless to say, charter 
schools have not followed a single model (Finn et al., 2016). 
These schools have been authorized to operate differently in each state with 
charter school legislation.  Some states have authorized only local school districts and/or 
the state education department (or its appointed entity) to grant charters.  Others allow 
universities or other nonprofit entities to issue charters.  In some instances, highly 
successful charter schools have been authorized to replicate themselves (Finn et al., 
2016). 
This review of the literature revealed that charter schools have been growing and 
expanding in the United States, and that they were born of demands for school choice in 
response to continued reports of a lack of sufficient academic achievement in the public 
schools.  This review now turns its focus to charter schools in Florida. 
Charter Schools in Florida 
History in Florida 
Florida’s legislature failed to authorize charter schools to operate in the state 
during the 1995 legislative session despite the efforts of Deputy Education Commissioner 
Frank Darden who supported the concept.  Many African-American legislators were 
opposed to charter schools, claiming they would become segregated institutions and 
would become public schools for the elite.  The charter school legislation was bundled 
into an omnibus bill that included numerous other reforms.  When the bill was debated, 
various parts of it were excised, making it unacceptable to certain legislators.  That 
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caused the bill not to pass.  Several legislators hoped that the charter school legislation 
would become part of the state’s budget bill that still needed to be passed (Rado, 1995, 
May 7).  Despite the failure of that attempt, there was verbiage in the budget that 
authorized expenditures for innovative programs.  “Darden said Education Commissioner 
Frank Brogan now has the authority to approve a charter school with a specific focus, 
such as for poor, disadvantaged students” (Rado, 1995, May 12, para. 8).  In the interim 
before legislation could be introduced for the 1996 legislative session, the Department of 
Education would continue engaging with school districts to lay the foundation for charter 
schools once authorizing legislation passed (Rado, 1995, May 12). 
During the 1996 session of the Florida Legislature, legislators passed a sweeping 
education bill that included the authorization for the operation of charter schools.  Deputy 
Education Commissioner Brogan speculated that although nearly 500 charters were 
authorized, no more than ten would begin during the 1996-1997 school year (Rado, 1996, 
May 5).  By the end of the 1996-1997 school year, five charter schools were operating in 
the state (Perkins-Gough, 1997). 
Charter schools soon began to spring up across the state.  Although schools 
opened initially in Dade, Escambia, Leon, Okaloosa, Polk, and Walton counties, an 
additional 18 schools planned to open the following year in Brevard, Broward, 
Hillsborough, Orange, Pinellas, and Seminole counties (Ledger, 1997, March 25). 
One year later during the 1998 legislative session, consideration was given to 
expanding the charter school legislation in a manner that would enable school districts to 
increase radically the number of charters they could authorize.  While testifying before 
the Senate Education Committee, teacher’s union representative Pat Tomillo told the 
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senators, “You’re about to slip into, in my opinion, dangerous waters” (Rado, 1998, 
March 18).  Eventually, with amendments, the bill passed the legislature.  Additionally, 
the legislature authorized charter schools to receive public monies for limited capital 
projects including school construction and the purchase of property.  Senate Education 
Committee chairman John Grant, the legislation’s sponsor, said “I was delighted when 
the governor called to tell me he would let (the charter schools bill) become law…Charter 
schools are a good educational alternative and the ones that we have are working” 
(Wallsten, 1998, May 23). 
Following the 1998 legislative session, charter schools continued to proliferate in 
Florida.  The legislature also continued to amend the charter school laws.  One such 
amendment allowed school districts to convert schools to charter schools and several, 
including Hillsborough County, planned to take advantage of that provision (Chion-
Kennedy, 1998, November 17). 
By the end of 2004, 39 states and territories had charter schools.  Over 83,000 
students attended 300 charter schools in Florida.  Only California and Arizona had more 
charter schools operating in their states (Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Government Accountability [OPPAGA], 2005b).   
The Florida Legislature completely rewrote the education code in 2002 in a 
special session (Laws of Florida, 2002).  The code needed to be rewritten because both 
the K-12 and the State University System had been completely restructured into a single 
entity overseen by a common State Board of Education during the 2000 legislative 
session (Revamping Education Governance in Florida, 2002).  The rewritten code was 
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the product of the state Department of Education working with varied educational 
interests (St. Petersburg Times, 2002, March 31). 
Although the charter school law required annual reporting to the Florida 
Department of Education (FDOE) by the individual charter schools, none were submitted 
until November 2006 (MacGillis, 2015, January 26).  In 2003, state officials cautioned 
charter school operators that additional evaluation of charter schools was on the horizon.  
At the 2003 Florida Charter School Conference, Commissioner of Education Jim Horne 
said, “You must perform.  You need to begin to evaluate your game” (Catalanello, 2003, 
October 17).  Lack of accountability by charter schools, however, continued for some 
years.  A Miami Herald investigative report in 2011 stated: 
However, while charter schools have grown into a $400-million-a-year business 
in South Florida, receiving about $6,000 in taxpayer dollars for every student 
enrolled, they continue to operate with little public oversight.  Even when charter 
schools have been caught violating state laws, school districts have few tools to 
demand compliance. (Hiassen & McGrory, 2011 September 19, para. 3) 
 
Many of these legal violations involved financial mismanagement.  Although 
there were recommendations to the legislature to tighten control over charter school 
finances, Governor Rick Scott signed legislation lowering reporting requirements for 
high-performing charter schools from monthly to quarterly (Hiassen & McGrory, 2011, 
September 19).   
There were other calls made for additional oversight for charter schools.  The 
Florida Legislature’s Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 
reported that finances were a concern with Florida charter schools.  The report singled 
out charter schools managed by education management organizations as having a “high 
prevalence of financial deficits” (OPPAGA, 2005a, p. 10).  A follow-up report in 2008 
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showed progress but continued to identify needs in financial reporting.  The report cited a 
number of instances where potential conflicts of interest arose including news reports 
alleging conflicts between charter school governing board members and charter school 
operators.  The report recommended emendation of the law to make conflict of interest 
provisions clearer (OPPAGA, 2008). 
The charter school law removed many regulations from charter schools including 
much oversight.  As noted by Hiassen and McGrory (2011), “It has given rise to a cottage 
industry of professional charter school management companies that – along with the 
landlords and developers who own and build schools – control the lion’s share of charter 
schools’ money” (para. 19). 
Because in Florida,  only not-for-profit boards can apply to open charter schools, 
“for-profit charter companies set up foundations to file the application and then hire those 
companies to operate the schools” (MacGillis, 2015, January 26, para 19).  Some 
developers partnered with charter school companies to build schools with public money.  
In some circles, these schools were known as “McCharters” (MacGillis, 2015, January 
26, para 18).  Some management companies own the land or buildings occupied by the 
charter school it manages.  In addition to management fees, some of these companies 
collect over 25% of the school's revenue on lease payments (Hiassen & McGrory, 2011, 
September 19). 
The latest critical event in the history of Florida’s charter schools took place in 
Jefferson County, a rural county in the panhandle of Florida just east of Tallahassee 
(Jefferson County, FL, 2017).  It is a rural, low-income county with a population of 
approximately 14,000.  Whites comprise 62% of the county’s population.  The past 16 
 40 
years marked a period of “white flight” from the district when public school enrollment 
declined from 2,066 to 770.  In 2016, only 17% of the student population was White, 
making Jefferson County a predominately Black school district despite the larger number 
of Whites living in the district (Jefferson County, FL, 2017; Legg, 2017, June 5). 
Jefferson County public schools had major financial difficulty in 2009 and again 
in 2016 (Legg, 2017, June 5; Stewart, 2016, August 10).  Florida Commissioner of 
Education Pam Stewart declared Jefferson County schools to be in a “state of financial 
emergency” and called an emergency meeting of the State Board of Education to appoint 
a “financial emergency board” to oversee the school district’s return to “a solid financial 
footing” (Stewart, 2016, August 10, pp. 2-3).  In 2009, following the first financial 
emergency, some parents removed their children from the public schools and transferred 
them to either private schools in Jefferson County or to Tallahassee public schools in 
neighboring Leon County (Legg, 2017, June 5).  This further reduced the number of 
white students in the schools because the three private schools in Jefferson County 
reported a mere 7% minority enrollment (Legg, 2017, June 5). 
Jefferson County had more than a financial problem; they also had a student 
achievement problem.  Their school district grades from 2010 through 2016 respectively 
were D, C, D, F, F, D, and D.  Those continual poor academic results ultimately caused 
the Florida Department of Education to have the Jefferson County School Board turn 
over management of its schools to Somerset, a for-profit charter school operator that is 
part of the Academica charter school chain (Legg, 2017, June 5).  This marked the first 
time an entire school district in Florida became a charter school district. 
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Enabling Legislation 
The 1996 legislation authorizing charter schools is contained in Chapter 96-186 of 
the Laws of Florida, corresponding to Florida Statutes §228.056 (repealed and replaced 
by Florida Statutes §1002.33).  The purposes of charter schools as specified in the initial 
legislation included the improvement of learning by students; providing increased 
opportunities for all students, but especially for academically low-performing children; 
encouraging innovative and unique methods of learning; increasing school choice 
opportunities; creating new accountability measures for schools; requiring that learning 
gains be measured by creating new and updated measurement instruments; having the 
school as the center of improvement rather than other structures; and expanding 
opportunities for teachers to control the educational program at each school (Joint 
Legislative Management Committee, 1996). 
The legislation outlined the requirements for proposing a charter school, for 
sponsorship of charter schools, and for limiting the number of charter schools that could 
operate in each county based on school population.  Enrollment in charter schools was 
authorized for any pupil living within the boundaries of the charter school’s public school 
district (Joint Legislative Management Committee, 1996).  Enrollment could only be 
limited by space in which case the charter school had to assure that each applicant had 
“an equal chance of being admitted through a random selection process” (Joint 
Legislative Management Committee, 1996, p. 464).  Targeted enrollment was permitted 
only by grade or age level, and at-risk students.  Handicapped and English Language 
Learning students were required to be admitted on the same basis as any other students. 
Charter schools were required to be not-for-profit corporations and could choose 
to be either public or private employers.  As a public employer, charter schools could 
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elect to participate in the Florida Retirement System (Joint Legislative Management 
Committee, 1996).  
The initial charter could not exceed three years but could be renewed for up to 
three years at each renewal period.  Charter schools were required to report annually to 
their sponsors, both the State Board and Commissioner of Education, the Speaker of the 
Florida House of Representatives, and the President of the Florida Senate (Joint 
Legislative Management Committee, 1996).   
The statute contained nonrenewal and termination provisions including a 
prohibition of the local school district from assuming the legal debts of a defunct charter 
school.  The statute did not contain an appeal mechanism for adverse decisions against 
charter schools.  Charter schools are “exempt from all statutes of the Florida School 
Code, except those pertaining to civil rights and student health, safety, and welfare, or as 
otherwise required by this section” (Joint Legislative Management Committee, 1996, p. 
468).   
Teachers in charter schools are required to be certified by the State Department of 
Education.  Employees of charter schools must be fingerprinted as required by statute.  
Teachers may choose to form professional groups that they own, and serve under contract 
to the charter school, in which case they cannot be public employees.  If the school 
district agrees, teachers from that district may take a leave of absence from the district 
and may maintain their seniority in the district while they are employed by the charter 
school (Joint Legislative Management Committee, 1996).   
Charter schools have received funds from the school district in the amount the 
district would have to fund their students’ education.  If the student would have received 
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additional funding because of a special need in the school district, those additional funds 
also transfer to the charter school.  Eligible students in charter schools must be provided 
any federal funds the school district received to provide the students with the same 
services they would have received in the school district (Joint Legislative Management 
Committee, 1996).   
Charter schools have been obligated to provide transportation for their students in 
accordance with state law governing transportation to traditional public schools.  The 
charter school is authorized to contract with the school district to provide the 
transportation.  The statute required that, “The charter school shall ensure that 
transportation is not a barrier to equal access for all students residing within a reasonable 
distance of the charter school as determined in its charter” (Joint Legislative Management 
Committee, 1996, p. 469).   
Charter schools have been required to instruct students for the same minimum 
number of days as other public schools but may add to that minimum number of days.  
Charter school facilities must comply with the State Uniform Building Code for Public 
Educational Facilities Construction or with other minimum state building and fire codes 
(Joint Legislative Management Committee, 1996).   
Current Legislation 
By 2015, the enabling legislation for charter schools had been amended over 20 
times.  Charter school purposes were expanded to include creation of “innovative 
measurement tools,” stimulating traditional public school improvement by providing 
“rigorous competition,” providing for an expansion of the public school system’s 
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capacity, and helping to relieve the impact of school districts caused by construction of 
new residences and homes (Florida Statutes, 2015, §1002.33 (2) (c)). 
School district employees involved either directly or indirectly with a charter 
school application have been protected from reprisal by the school district.  Appeal of 
negative charter school decisions by local school districts is authorized to be made to the 
State Board of Education’s Charter School Appeal Commission.  Disclosure of 
employees of charter schools who “are related to the charter school owner, president, 
chairperson of the governing board of directors, superintendent, governing board 
member, principal, assistant principal, or any other person who has equivalent 
decisionmaking authority” must be made to the school district or charter school sponsor 
(Florida Statutes, 2015, §1002.33 (7) (c) (18)).Relative is defined as “father, mother , son, 
daughter , brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, niece, husband, wife, father-
in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, 
stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, or half 
sister” (Florida Statutes, 2015, §1002.33 (7) (c) (18)). 
Exemplary charter schools can have their charters renewed for 15 years, but are 
subject to review annually and the charter can be canceled before its expiration.  Annual 
budgets are required to be adopted by the governing board.  Corrective actions are 
required for charter schools that earn “three consecutive grades of ‘D’, two consecutive 
grades of ‘D’ followed by a grade of ‘F’, or two nonconsecutive grades of ‘F’ within a 3-
year period” (Florida Statutes, 2015, §1002.33 (9) (n) (2) (a)). 
Enrollment preferences have been authorized for siblings of a student who attends 
the charter school, children of charter school governing board members, children of 
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charter school employees, children of charter-school-in-the-workplace employees, 
children of a municipal resident of a charter-school-in-a-municipality, voluntary 
prekindergarten graduates who graduated from the charter school’s voluntary 
prekindergarten program or the charter school’s governing board voluntary 
prekindergarten program in the prior school year, or children of active duty members of 
the United States Armed Forces (Florida Statutes, 2015). 
Charter schools have also been authorized to limit enrollment to target only 
specific populations of students.  These populations include limited ages or grades; 
academically at-risk students including drop-out risk; charter-school-in-the-workplace or 
charter-school-in-a-municipality students;  students living in reasonable proximity to the 
charter school, except that they are subject to a random lottery and to ethnic/racial 
balance provisions, if applicable; students with particular academic or artistic talents 
consistent with the school’s charter; students articulating to the school based on an 
articulation agreement; and, students residing in a development in which the developer 
provided space for the charter school, subject to limitations based on the property’s 
appraised valuation (Florida Statutes, 2015). 
Charter school students have been eligible to participate in interscholastic events 
that are extracurricular at the public school where the student would otherwise attend.  
Charter school employees and contractors must have a valid background screening.  
Instructional personnel and school administrators who have been convicted of crimes 
enumerated in Florida Statutes §1012.315 have been prohibited to be employed in any 
position that has direct contact with students (Florida Statutes, 2015). 
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There have been several legal challenges to Florida’s charter school law.  
Academies of Excellence applied to operate a charter school in Volusia County.  After 
review of the application, the school board denied permission; and the applicant appealed 
to the State Board of Education who reversed the decision of the local board and 
authorized the applicant to operate a charter school.  The school board appealed the 
ruling of the State Board of Education, arguing that “because the act of operating and 
controlling all free public schools in Volusia County is conferred exclusively on the 
School Board, [Florida Statute] section 1002.33(6)(c) is unconstitutional because it 
permits the State Board to open a charter school” (School Board of Volusia County, 
2008, p. 1191).  The court ruled that the statute grants review authority to the State Board 
of Education and if approved after that review, control of the charter school is vested in 
the local school board in compliance with the Florida Constitution.  The court specifically 
noted that after approval, the local district retains the authority to operate, control, and 
supervise all public schools within the district (School Board of Volusia County, 2008).  
In 1999, the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida approved the Joseph 
Littles Nguzo Saba Charter School (hereafter, Joseph Littles) to operate (Imhotep-
Nghuzo Saba Charter School, 2007).  In 2005, Joseph Littles applied to the school board 
to open two additional charter schools, (a) the Imhotep-Nguzo Saba Charter School and 
(b) the Mandela-Nguzo Saba Charter School.  The school board denied the applications 
based on a school board policy that implements a State Board of Education waiver on the 
number of charter schools permitted to operate in the county (Imhotep-Nghuzo Saba 
Charter School, 2007).   
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Joseph Littles appealed to the State Board of Education.  The state board referred 
the appeal to the Florida Charter School Appeal Commission for review and a non-
binding recommendation.  The commission recommended approval of the charter 
because it felt the State Board did not have statutory cause to deny the application 
(Imhotep-Nghuzo Saba Charter School, 2007).  At a subsequent hearing conducted by the 
State Board of Education, Joseph Littles argued that the school board policy upon which 
the original rejection was based was ultra vires,i.e.,“a body exercising an invalid excess 
of power or authority” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2017, para. 2) because charter schools 
are exempt from school board policies (Imhotep-Nghuzo Saba Charter School, 2007).  
The State Board of Education rejected the Appeal Commission recommendation and 
voted to deny the charter. 
The Court found that the charter schools relied 
…on Florida Statutes section 1002.33(5)(b)4., which states that the "sponsor's 
policies shall not apply to a charter school." This reliance is misplaced. While the 
subject provision was clearly aimed at giving charter schools some measure of 
academic and administrative freedom, we do not read this provision to prohibit 
the School Board from adopting and enforcing policies related to the creation, 
renewal or termination of the charter schools they sponsor (Imhotep-Nghuzo Saba 
Charter School, 2007, p. 1282). 
 
The schools argued further that the denial of their application was without good 
cause as required by the enabling statute.  The court found that “…the ‘Guiding 
Principles; Purpose’ section of the charter school statute provides sufficient legislative 
guidance to support the School Board’s Policy” (Imhotep-Nghuzo Saba Charter School, 
2007, p. 1284).   
The court affirmed the decision of the State Board of Education in denying the 
application.  They determined that the State Board’s finding regarding the local board’s 
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decision was based on “competent and substantial evidence” and that the State Board’s 
decision must be treated with a “great deal of deference” (Imhotep-Nghuzo Saba Charter 
School, 2007,p. 128).   
In another example, the Tampa School Development Corporation operated two 
charter schools in Hillsborough County.  Trinity School was an elementary school, and 
the Upper School was a middle school.  The elementary school was chartered in 1999 as 
a K-8 school.  In 2004, the school board allowed Trinity to split its charter into two 
schools to take advantage of federal funding for new charter schools.  The Upper School 
was given a separate charter.  Both schools were determined to be “A” rated schools 
(School Board of Hillsborough County, 2013). 
In 2008 after experiencing some fiscal difficulties in operating two schools, 
Trinity applied to the school board to consolidate the two charters back into one.  Trinity 
calculated savings of approximately $120,000 every year with the consolidation.  In May 
2010 when the charter was up for renewal the school board sent Trinity only one charter 
renewal contract that covered both schools (School Board of Hillsborough County, 
2013).   
In June 2010, the school board learned it stood to lose $60,000 if they authorized 
the consolidation of the two schools and rejected the consolidation offer Trinity made.  
After unsuccessful mediation, the matter went to a hearing with an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) who granted Trinity’s consolidation request (School Board of Hillsborough 
County, 2013).   
The school board appealed the ALJ’s order, alleging that the ALJ “lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction and erred in reversing the School Board's denial” (School Board of 
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Hillsborough County, 2013, p. 920).  They also claimed the charter school law, Florida 
Statutes §1002.33, was unconstitutional because it “impinges on the School Board's 
authority to run the public school system in Hillsborough County” (School Board of 
Hillsborough County, 2013, p. 920). 
The court first addressed the jurisdictional issue and found that the consolidation 
was not a new charter application but instead was a modification to an existing charter 
contract.  The court adopted the ALJ’s reason and language, stating: “Because of [sic] the 
issue brought forward by Trinity School occurs in the context of an existing charter and is 
a dispute concerning the charter school statute, subject matter jurisdiction is proper under 
section 1002.33(6)(h) (School Board of Hillsborough County, 2013, p. 922). 
Citing its holding in the case of School Board of Volusia County vs. Academies 
of Excellence, Inc. the court dismissed the school board’s constitutional argument and 
affirmed the decision of the ALJ (School Board of Hillsborough County, 2013). 
Charter School Management 
By statute, “Every charter school in Florida must be organized as or operated by, 
a nonprofit organization” (Florida Statutes, 2015, §1002.33 (12) (i)).  That means the 
governing board of the charter school must be formed as a not-for-profit corporation, but 
that does not preclude the school from contracting or associating with a not-for profit or 
for-profit management company (Florida Statutes, 2015).   
Some charter schools have chosen to manage themselves without the assistance of 
an outside group.  Others have employed a management company.  For those that choose 
management companies, there are two models they can select.  One is a for-profit model 
known as an education management organization (EMO).  The other is a not-for-profit 
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model known as a charter management organization (CMO).  Both EMOs and CMOs are 
designed to operate a number of charter schools in a centralized manner to achieve 
economy of scale, similar to that of a school district.  (Farrell, Wohlstetter, & Smith, 
2012; Quinn, Oelberger, & Meyerson, 2016; Roch & Sai, 2015).  Nationally, as of the 
2014-15 school year there were 1,882 charter schools managed by CMOs, 1,059 
managed by EMOs, and 3,662 operating independently (National Alliance for Public 
Charter Schools, 2017). 
Both management models are similar.  They seek to operate the school:  EMOs, 
with the stated purpose of making money for their shareholders (Conn, 2002); and 
CMOs, without the profit motive.  Baker and Miron (2015) used the term “EMO” 
interchangeably for both for-profit and not-for-profit management organizations.  They 
noted that “Most nonprofit EMOs look, act, and have management agreements similar to 
for-profit EMOs” (Baker & Miron, 2015, p. 7).  Many CMOs have been supported by the 
New Schools Venture Fund (NSVF), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and other 
similar entities that have provided over one-half billion dollars to CMOs as of 2009 
(Baker & Miron, 2015; Farrell et al., 2012; Quinn et al., 2016).  Generally, the CMO has 
had a central office staff that supports or operates a number of schools.   
Some of the functions that CMOs perform for charter schools include assistance 
with financial, personnel, and facility management, including facility procurement.  By 
bringing several or more charter schools under one management plan, bulk purchasing of 
equipment and supplies, as well as utilization of specialized teaching staff, can lead to 
economic savings.  With the ability of a CMO to help plan for all of the schools under its 
 51 
aegis, innovations can be shared more easily as can the replication of successful charter 
school programs (Farrell et al., 2012).   
The first CMO was developed by Don Shavley and Reed Hastings who formed 
Aspire Public Schools in 1998.  Shavley, who was operating a charter school, was a 
former superintendent of schools.  Hastings was a technology-minded businessman and 
philanthropist (Farrell et al., 2012; Quinn et al., 2016; Wilson, Levin, & Mathews, 2005).  
The Aspire model required conformity to “curriculum, instruction, and operation across 
all schools, with limited room for local adjustment” (Quinn et al., 2016, p. 20).  The idea 
was to strictly regulate both the instructional and business sides of charter school 
operation.  This concept marked a change in charter school founding philosophy of 
establishing schools that were able to operate independently in an effort to innovate and 
not be tied to a centralized system of control (Quinn, 2016). 
Also in 1998, Kim Smith, a social entrepreneur, along with venture capitalists 
John Doerr and Brook Byers, started what came to be known as the New Schools Venture 
Fund (NSVF).  These businessmen “believed that education entrepreneurs could … bring 
about much-needed change in public education if they had access to both early-stage 
capital and strategic, hands-on support to start and grow their organizations” (New 
Schools Venture Fund, 2017, para. 1).   
One issue that arose for charter schools in the early years was school funding.  To 
obtain agreement from the states and pass legislation to authorize charter schools, some 
agreed to accept lower per-pupil payments from the public treasury.  This compromise 
postulated that charter schools could provide a better education for less money so long as 
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they were freed from many of the public school’s regulations.  This was, in many 
respects, naïve (Finn et al., 2016).   
School facilities were also a cost factor to charter schools.  Charter schools were 
often left on their own to secure adequate facilities with little, if any, assistance from the 
public school district or the state.  Philanthropy and private capital infusions alleviated 
some of those concerns but brought charges of profiteering and privatization (Finn et al., 
2016).   
For-profit management of charter schools has brought with it other concerns.  
While providing many of the same management tools as CMOs, EMOs also have the 
intention of creating profit for their investors (Conn, 2002).  This is nowhere more 
evident than in real estate dealings. 
Though CMOs at times engage in real estate transactions to provide charter 
school facilities, this is most often seen with EMOs (Baker & Miron, 2015; Fabricant & 
Fine, 2012).  One of the most common methods of EMOs profiting from charter school 
real estate is through Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). As an example, the EMO 
opens another corporation, a real estate corporation, as a wholly-owned subsidiary.  The 
real estate corporation purchases property, upgrades it, and sells it to a REIT at a profit.  
The REIT then subleases the property back to the EMO’s real estate corporation which 
then leases it back to the charter school.  Often the rentals amount to thousands of dollars 
per pupil, a large portion of the charter school’s income (Baker & Miron, 2015; Fabricant 
& Fine, 2012; Finn et al., 2016; Kelley, 2015). 
Another method EMOs use to generate profits is known as a “sweeps” contract 
(Kelley, 2015, p. 1802).  In this contract, the EMO receives virtually all of the income the 
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charter school receives from all sources immediately upon receipt.  The EMO then totally 
operates the charter school with everything it needs including instructional and 
administrative staff, facilities, furnishings, books, materials, financial services, 
equipment, everything needed to operate a school.  At the end of the year, whatever 
money is left becomes profit for the EMO (Kelley, 2015). 
Building on this understanding of where charter schools originated, their purpose, 
their legislative basis, and their management models, the researcher next considered the 
results these entities have achieved, as reported in the research.  Charter schools are 
compared with traditional public schools nationwide and then in Florida.  This is 
followed by an examination of student achievement at charter schools managed by not-
for-profit management entities compared to those who utilize for-profit management 
companies. 
Charter School Student Achievement 
Traditional Public School vs. Charter Schools 
Nationwide 
Since the inception of charter schools in 1992, researchers have been looking at 
the student achievement results these schools produce.  The results have been mixed, and 
there are many conflicting data.  “It is important to recognize that despite discrepancies 
across studies, there is a general consensus among researchers that charter schools are not 
a panacea.  Evidence of charter school performance outstripping traditional public 
schools is limited” (Silverman, 2012, p. 264).  Finn et al. (2016) reported: 
Broadly speaking, charters show positive effects for poor children (especially 
black and Hispanic students), often for English language learners, and sometimes 
for special education students.  For white and Asian students, however, the effects 
 54 
are generally negative or neutral….In urban areas, where students are 
overwhelmingly low-achieving, poor and non-white, charter schools tend to do 
better than other public schools in improving student achievement.  By contrast, 
outside of urban areas, where students tend to be white and middle class, charters 
do no better and sometimes worse than public schools. (p. 50) 
 
The most recent comprehensive study of student achievement in charter schools 
was conducted by the Stanford University’s Center for Research on Education Outcomes 
(CREDO).The researchers examined charter schools in 27 states enrolling 95% of all 
charter school students in the country.  The data included observations of 1,532,506 
students and a matching group of students in traditional public schools.  “Matching is 
done on the basis of a Virtual Control Record protocol, which creates a ‘virtual twin’ for 
each charter student who is represented in the data” (Center for Research, 2013, p. 9). 
Different student groups in charter schools were determined to have had differing 
outcomes on student achievement when compared to students in traditional public 
schools.  White students had negative growth in reading and mathematics.  Overall, Black 
students had positive growth in both reading and mathematics; however, there were 
differences between Black students in poverty and Black students not in poverty.  Black 
students in poverty showed positive growth in both reading and mathematics, but those 
students not in poverty scored similarly to students in traditional public schools.  
Hispanic students in charter schools overall scored similarly to Hispanic students in 
traditional public schools in both reading and mathematics.  Hispanic students in poverty 
scored positively compared to Hispanic students not in poverty, but those not in poverty 
scored negatively compared to students in traditional public schools.  Hispanic ELL 
students scored positively in both reading and mathematics, but Hispanic non-ELL 
students scored positively in reading and similarly in mathematics.  Asian students scored 
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similarly in reading and negatively in mathematics; special education students scored 
similarly in reading and positively in mathematics (Center for Research, 2013). 
In a review of charter school academic results, Miron and Nelson (2001) 
examined the results of independent charter school accountability (including academic 
achievement) reports from seven states:  California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.  The authors lamented that 
despite charter schools having a 10-year history, there were few studies that examined 
charter school student achievement with a quality measure.  Ultimately, they found that 
“the existing body of research reveals a mixed picture, with studies from some states 
suggesting a positive impact, studies from other states suggesting negative impact, and 
some providing evidence of positive and negative impacts” (Miron & Nelson, 2001, 
abstract). 
A North Carolina study was conducted to examine student achievement in charter 
schools based on the North Carolina Education Research Data Center data.  Bifulco and 
Ladd (2004) analyzed individual test scores on end-of-grade tests with data coming from 
the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction.  The data covered all third-grade 
students in the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.  Using identifiers, the 
investigators were able to follow the students through the eighth-grade or the year they 
left North Carolina schools.  Data “cohorts range[d] in size from 93,349 in 1996 to 
106,106 in 2000” (Bifulco & Ladd, 2004, p. 13).   
The results of this study indicated that charter school students in North Carolina 
performed below where they would have performed had they been in traditional public 
schools.  Bifulco and Ladd (2004) also found large negative effects because of charter 
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school attendance.  They also determined that traditional public schools did not adopt any 
new practices gleaned from their charter school colleagues. 
One study of Michigan charter schools focused on fourth-grade reading and 
mathematics scores on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program tests, as the 
majority of Michigan charter schools were elementary schools.  In this study, charter 
school students had lower scores on fourth-grade reading and mathematics as compared 
to their traditional public school counterparts.  One explanation for these results was that 
the Michigan charter schools tended to attract lower-performing students.  These lower-
performing students had left traditional public schools for charter schools.  Bettinger 
(2005) wrote, “There is no robust, significant evidence that test scores increase or 
decrease in neighboring public schools as the number of charters increases” (p. 145).  He 
concluded that charter school students did not have an appreciable academic gain, and 
may perform lower when compared to traditional public school students. 
In reviewing several studies, Heaggans (2006) found that charter schools had not 
demonstrated student achievement that would close the gap and that charter schools may 
not solve problems of inequality among students.  He determined that charter schools 
cause all students to suffer because they cause “irreparable financial harm to school 
districts” (p. 431).   
In a study examining the perceptions of parents whose children attend charter 
schools in Ohio, May (2006) found that even without statistically significant evidence  (a) 
student achievement in charter schools surpassed that of students in traditional public 
schools and (b) parents overwhelmingly preferred the charter school experience to that of 
the traditional public school.  Many parents chose charter schools because “they sought to 
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improve the quality of their child’s education and the academics and/or curriculum” 
(May, 2006, p. 32).  This study was conducted as a cross-sectional telephone survey of 
250 parents who withdrew their children from the traditional public school in an urban 
school district in Midwestern Ohio and enrolled them in independent charter schools 
(May, 2006). 
To systematically analyze the research on student achievement and charter 
schools as of 2011, the Albert Shanker Institute published a policy brief (DiCarlo, 2011).  
One focus of the policy brief was to address the question of whether charter schools 
produce larger gains in testing students than traditional public schools.  This examination, 
as in many other studies, revealed that academic performance of most charter schools 
compared to traditional public schools shows little difference between them.  DiCarlo 
also found that in urban areas, and when working with lower-performing students, charter 
schools tended to get somewhat better results than traditional public schools. 
In a seven-state study comparing charter schools to traditional public schools, 
Zimmer et al. used longitudinal student data gathered as the students moved between 
traditional public schools and charter schools.  Because they were analyzing data across 
various locations, they standardized the scores to z-scores using a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one.  They found that more often than not, charter schools and 
traditional public schools had little appreciable difference in student achievement.  Only 
in Denver and Milwaukee did charter schools outperform their traditional public school 
peers with positive, statistically significant differences in mathematics; in Ohio and 
Texas, however, they found negative statistically significant results in mathematics.  
When the researchers examined reading scores, they found no results that were positive 
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with statistical significance; in Ohio, Texas, and Chicago, however, they found 
statistically significant results that were negative.  This led them to conclude, “We find 
that students perform similarly across the two settings [charter schools and traditional 
public schools] in most locations” (Zimmer et al., 2012, p. 221). 
In a New York State study of charter school performance, Silverman (2012) 
studied 16 school districts that had both traditional public schools and charter schools.  
These districts included Albany, the Buffalo-Niagara Falls metropolitan area, Ithaca, the 
New York metropolitan area, Rochester, Syracuse, and Troy.  Student characteristics, as 
well as student achievement, were measured.  The investigators found that in charter 
schools there was higher student turnover than in traditional public schools.  They found 
that students who were eligible for free lunch were less likely to enroll in charter schools 
as compared to students eligible for reduced-price lunch who were more likely to enroll 
in charter schools.  Also, “Whites (p<.01), Hispanics (p<.001), and Asians 
(p<.001)…were less likely to enroll in charter schools.  However, Black and multiracial 
students were significantly (p<.001) more likely to enroll in charter schools” (Silverman, 
2012, p. 273). 
In addressing student achievement, Silverman (2012) found that sixth- and eighth-
grade mathematics scores were higher for charter schools but that there were no 
significant differences in English scores between charter schools and traditional public 
schools.  Also, Silverman found that there were no significant effects associated with 
charter schools and students passing either the English or mathematics New York State 
Regents examinations. 
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Using two cohorts of charter schools during the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, 
Clark, Gleason, Tuttle, and Silverberg (2015) compared student performance of students 
who were and were not selected by random lottery to attend a charter school.  The study 
schools were comprised of 33 charter middle schools in 13 states.  They found that 
charter schools, on average, showed negative impacts on student achievement that were 
non-significant.  Also, more disadvantaged students showed positive or insignificant 
gains while more advantaged students showed negative and insignificant gains in student 
achievement.  The investigators also found more positive results for students in urban 
areas than students in non-urban areas or in schools serving more advantaged students 
(Clark et al., 2015). 
A meta-analysis of the literature on student achievement in charter schools by 
Betts and Tang completed in 2011 also yielded mixed results.  The authors wrote, 
“Focusing on math and reading scores, the authors find compelling evidence that charters 
under-perform traditional public schools in some locations, grades, and subjects, and out-
perform traditional public schools in other locations, grades, and subjects” (p. 1).  They 
noted that for elementary school reading and for mathematics and reading in the middle 
schools, the evidence did not show any negative effects, and in some instances, showed 
positive effects.  The effect sizes they reported were 0.02 for elementary reading, 0.05 for 
elementary mathematics, and 0.055 for middle school mathematics (Betts & Tang, 2011).  
KIPP charter schools along with charter schools in both New York City and Boston 
showed somewhat larger and more positive effect sizes than charter schools in other 
locations (Betts & Tang, 2011).  López (2014), in a critique of Betts and Tang, found that 
their “conclusion is overstated; the actual results are not positive in reading and are not 
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significant in high school math; for elementary and middle school math, effect sizes are 
very small, ranging from 0.03 to 0.08 s.d.” (López, 2014, summary of review).  López 
concluded that there was no difference between test-score outcomes of charter schools 
and traditional public schools. 
Florida 
Studies on student achievement in Florida charter schools were few in number at 
the time of the present study.  One of the first studies was based on a program theory 
evaluation of charter schools by Crew and Anderson (2003).  These researchers posited 
that charter school students would have greater achievement than traditional public 
school students.  The theory’s rationale was that because of the success of charter 
schools, traditional public schools would incorporate ideas learned from the charter 
schools and this would lead to enhanced performance among traditional public schools 
(Crew & Anderson, 2003).   
The investigators used a mixed-methods approach to examine performance during 
the 1999-2000 school year.  They amassed data from FCAT results in reading and 
mathematics, annual school progress and financial reports, and a questionnaire that was 
sent to charter school principals and to school district officials charged with overseeing 
charter school matters. 
Results from their study revealed that charter schools have mixed performance 
results, some performing above average and others below average.  The researchers 
concluded that more charter schools than traditional public schools had a low level of 
academic performance.  They stated specifically that non-charter school students were 
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not outperformed by charter school students.  Additionally, they found that traditional 
public schools did not change in response to charter schools (Crew & Anderson, 2003). 
Florida’s charter school legislation has required that a review of charter schools 
be made annually to the legislature and other government officials (Florida Statutes, 
2015, §1002.33 (23)).  In an OPPAGA (2005b) report to the Legislature, charter school 
students were said to be less proficient in reading and mathematics than their traditional 
public school peers.  One possible reason offered for that discrepancy was that students 
attending charter schools often were achieving below grade level when they arrived at the 
charter school.  It was also observed in the report that though charter school students 
gained less than their peers in elementary and middle school, in charter high schools, 
student gains were higher than those of their traditional public school peers.  The 
investigators faulted many charter schools, citing that in one-third of these schools both 
academic progress and learning gains were poor compared to other charter schools 
(OPPAGA, 2005b). 
OPPAGA (2005b) offered a series of recommendations to the Florida Department 
of Education that included developing a template for charter school authorization and 
assisting school districts with guidelines to develop strong educational objectives for their 
schools. Further recommendations included providing training for applicants for charter 
schools and for local schools boards who oversee them to establish appropriate and 
measurable learning outcomes; and developing training and assistance for charter schools 
to aid them in using practices that enhance and promote high student achievement 
(OPPAGA, 2005b). 
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Also, OPPAGA (2005b) recommended that the legislature amend the charter 
school law to require authorizers to include performance expectations in new school 
charters and to require school districts to verify that, in fact, those performance 
expectations have been met (OPPAGA, 2005b).   
Hassel, Terrell, & Kowal (2006) also examined Florida charter school 
performance.  They too, found that based on the results of the Florida Comprehensive 
Assessment Test in reading and mathematics, charter school students did less well than 
students in traditional public schools.  There results for charter school students who met 
state expectations in mathematics were between 1% and 9% lower than in traditional 
public schools. For charter school students who met state expectations in reading, results 
were between1% and 6% lower than students in traditional public schools (Hassel et al., 
2006). 
The investigators also had some positive things to say about charter schools.  
They found that under the NCLB requirements, charter schools tended to outperform 
traditional public schools.  They explained this disparity by recognizing that the smaller 
charter school classes with few subgroups of students made it easier to meet the NCLB 
targets.  Furthermore, Black students were found to have fared better in charter schools 
than they had in traditional public schools.  Though Black charter school students scored 
lower than Black students in traditional public schools, their reading proficiency grew at 
a faster pace than that of their traditional public school peers (Hassel et al., 2006). 
In this same study, Hassel et al. (2006) found, similar to Sass (2006), traditional 
public schools located near charter schools and who sensed competition from the 
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charters, had greater mathematics score gains than did those traditional public schools 
that did not feel similar competition. 
The last reviewed study that focused exclusively on Florida charter schools was 
published in 2006 by Dr. Tim Sass, an economist at Florida State University.  Utilizing 
publically available data from the Florida Department of Education, the researcher used 
the results of a norm-referenced version of the FCAT, a test that was administered to all 
students in Grades 3-10 over the course of the study (1999-2000 through 2002-2003).  
That test was selected because it was a version of the SAT-9 and scores were scaled “so 
that a one-point increase in the score at one place on the scale represents the same 
difference in performance as a one-point increase anywhere else on the scale” (Sass, 
2006, p. 101).  The sample was limited to Grade 3-10 students who took the test 
consecutively three times between the years 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 (Sass, 2006). 
Analysis of the data revealed that charter schools scored lower in both reading 
and mathematics by 0.5 and 1.2 scale-score points respectively when compared to 
traditional public schools.  Further analysis, however, revealed that over time, charter 
school performance increased over the first four years of their existence.  By the fifth 
year of a charter school’s operation, charter students surpassed traditional public school 
achievement (Sass, 2006).  In examining the influence of charter schools on traditional 
public schools, the results indicated that the presence of a charter school in proximity to a 
traditional public school did correlate “with modest improvement in math achievement 
and no reduction in reading achievement in traditional public schools” (Sass, 2006, p. 
118).  Finally, Sass (2006) concluded that those charter schools that targeted students 
with disabilities or students deemed to be at-risk had lower achievement than charter 
 64 
schools that did not target those students or traditional public schools.  Also, charter 
school management structure did not show any impact on student achievement. 
Not-for-Profit versus For-Profit 
One charter school innovation that has transferred to some traditional public 
school districts is the use of an EMO.  In a 2001 review of for-profit EMOs and their 
operations in public education, Molnar (2001) found that the available evidence indicated 
that these entities cannot fulfill the responsibility of providing an appropriate education to 
produce responsible students and educated citizens.  Molnar contended that if EMOs 
could provide such an education, it would cost more than was being currently spent on 
public education.  One reason for the increased cost would be the obligation of the for-
profit corporation to provide its shareholders with a return on their investments.  Another 
reason for increased costs would be the oversight costs to ensure appropriate expenditures 
in the public interest without the diversion of funds for illicit private pecuniary gain 
(Molnar, 2001). 
Providing better educational results than traditional public schools has been one 
of the primary promises of charter schools, and many EMOs claimed success in 
providing better student achievement.  Unfortunately, these claims have not always borne 
out upon examination (Molnar, 2001).  Citing a 2001 study by Horn and Miron 
examining charter schools in Michigan, Molnar (2001) stated: 
Overall, charter schools showed no net increase in their students pass rates—the 
percentage of students in a school who passed these tests—from the 1995-’96 
school year to the 1999-2000 school year, while public school districts where 
those charters were based saw their pass rates rise from 49.4% in 1995-’96 to 
68% in 1999-2000 (p. 4). 
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Molnar (2001), citing Miron and Applegate’s 2000 study of Edison Schools, a 
for-profit management corporation, wrote that although Edison claimed its students 
exceeded grade-level on norm-referenced testing, they were, in fact, on grade-level but 
did not exceed it.  When reviewing criterion-referenced tests, Edison students routinely 
scored below students in traditional public schools but their scores exceeded those of the 
traditional public schools 10% of the time.  Other examples of exaggeration by EMOs 
relative to student achievement were also noted (Molnar, 2001).  Molnar concluded his 
study by asserting that for-profit management companies managing public schools were 
not likely to accomplish the goal of improving public education.  “The for-profits do, 
however, seem quite capable of harming existing public schools” (Molnar, 2001, p. 12). 
Not every evaluation of school management organizations has been negative.  The 
Program on Education Policy and Governance of Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government examined the outcome of Philadelphia’s experience with both for-profit and 
not-for-profit management entities from 2002 through 2008.  The State of Pennsylvania 
asked the Philadelphia school district to turn over its lowest-performing elementary and 
middle schools to EMOs.  For-profit EMOs received contracts to operate 30 schools, and 
not-for-profit EMOs received contracts to operate 16 schools.  The three for-profit 
companies were divided as follows: 20 schools were contracted to Edison Schools, five to 
Victory Schools, and five to Chancellor Beacon Academies.  Of the schools managed by 
not-for-profit companies, five were contracted to foundations, five to Temple University, 
three to Universal Companies, and three to the University of Pennsylvania (Peterson & 
Chingos, 2009). 
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The school district provided the evaluators with student test scores in both reading 
and mathematics from 2001 through 2008.  The years 2001 and 2002 were data from 
before the intervention and served as prior student performance. The years 2003 through 
2008 were the years of the management intervention.  The test data used were from the 
Terra Nova, the SAT-9, and the Pennsylvania State System of Assessment, the 
instrument used by the state to determine compliance with the requirement of NCLB 
(Peterson & Chingos, 2009).The evaluators found that the students in schools managed 
by for-profit EMOs gained 20% of a standard deviation in reading corresponding to 
approximately 36% of one year’s learning.  This result was not statistically significant.  
In mathematics, the students in the for-profit managed schools gained 25% of a standard 
deviation corresponding to approximately 60% of a year’s learning.  This figure was 
statistically significant (Peterson & Chingos, 2009). 
For the students in the not-for-profit managed schools, the reading scores showed 
students decreased 9% of a standard deviation, corresponding to approximately 32% of a 
year’s learning.  This figure was only statistically significant in the first year.  In 
mathematics, the students decreased 21% of a standard deviation corresponding to 
approximately 50% of a year’s learning.  This figure, also, was only statistically 
significant in the first year (Peterson & Chingos, 2009).  In discussing these results, the 
evaluators cautioned against generalizing from these findings, because the for-profit 
EMOs had more experience in managing schools than the not-for-profit EMOs who 
“seem to have been selected as much for their strong political base as for any history of 
effectiveness at delivering educational services” (Peterson & Chingos, 2009, pp. 27-28). 
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Garcia et al. (2009) studied Arizona charter schools to determine if there was a 
difference between for-profit, not-for-profit, and traditional public schools in reading and 
mathematics student achievement.  They reviewed scale-score results from the state-
required administration of the SAT-9 from Grades 2-8 over the years 2001-2003.  The 
reading portion of the SAT-9 examined reading vocabulary and reading comprehension, 
and the mathematics portion of the SAT-9 examined mathematics procedures and 
mathematics problem-solving.  Both the reading vocabulary and mathematics procedures 
measure basic skills.  Reading comprehension and mathematics problem-solving measure 
complex thinking skills (Garcia et al., 2009). 
Garcia et al. (2009) found that neither for-profit nor not-for-profit charter schools 
exhibited a difference in total score student achievement over traditional public schools 
with one exception.  The exception was for the not-for-profit charter schools which 
showed higher student achievement in total mathematics over traditional public schools.  
Citing Sass (2006), Garcia and colleagues concurred that there was no difference between 
the for-profit or not-for-profit status alone.  In further analysis, students who attended a 
for-profit charter school for three consecutive years showed a small, statistically positive 
effect in basic reading skills as measured by the reading vocabulary test with a 
corresponding small, negative effect in complex thinking skills as measured by the 
reading comprehension test (Garcia et al., 2009). 
Garcia et al. (2009) explained some of this difference by looking at the 
motivations and control levels of the for-profit EMOs.  Because profit-making is a goal 
of for-profits, they seek to lower costs wherever possible.  Because education is labor-
intensive, some seek ways to reduce costs by looking for a way to limit the need for 
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professional labor.  This may take the form of standardized curricula and increased 
emphasis on basic skills.  Some for-profit EMOs that exercise a high level of control on 
the schools they manage have often used highly-structured curricula and assessments that 
favor basic skills over critical thinking skills (Garcia et al., 2009). 
Toson (2011) posited that many for-profit EMOs operate in urban areas where 
educational quality and student achievement are problematic, and the student population 
is often composed of poor, Black and minority children.  She stated, “Schools are still 
failing children and families.  EMOs offer an effective option for change” (p. 660).  
Toson (2011) stressed that EMOs can, without much bureaucratic control and with their 
financial resources, open up quality charter schools in urban areas.  
Having conducted no independent research, Toson (2011) relied on the work of 
others, including Garcia, et al. (2009), writing, “Given that research has shown EMOs to 
do what they set out to do, chances are that they too will deliver on improving complex 
thinking skills for their students when they set out to do that” (Toson, 2011, p. 
664).Clearly an advocate for EMOs, she concluded that they need to be given the 
opportunity to expand (Toson, 2011). 
Summary 
This chapter began with a review of the accountability movement starting with the 
publication of A Nation at Risk and the enactment of NCLB.  As a result of those 
influences, charter school legislation was enacted in Minnesota.  Charters rapidly spread 
across the nation and were authorized in Florida in 1996.  Next, Florida legislation, 
including several challenges to the validity of the law, was reviewed.  The two charter 
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school management models were presented including for-profit EMOs and not-for-profit 
CMOs as well as independent charter schools. 
Existing research on student achievement in charter schools was also discussed.  
The research generally provides a mixed picture of charter school success.  There are 
instances where charters have been successful and others where they were not.  The 
majority of the research appears to indicate that charter schools often have the most 
successful results in urban areas where they tend to serve underprivileged, poor, and 
academically-challenged students.   
The chapter concluded with an examination of the literature on charter school 
management models.  That research is also mixed, and no determination has been made 
as to whether one management model outperforms the other.  That gap in the literature 






This chapter describes the methods used to answer the two research questions 
posed in Chapter 1, to determine if there is any difference in student achievement (for 
English Language Arts (reading) in Grades 4, 8, and 10 and for mathematics in Grades 4 
and 8) between (a) charter schools with a for-profit management model and (b) charter 
schools with a not-for-profit management model.  The investigation, a static, non-
experimental design used existing data from the 2016 administration of the FSA in 
Grades 4, 8, and 10 ELA and Grades 4 and 8 mathematics.  Mean scale scores on the 
tests were the outcome used to determine if there were statistically significant differences 
in achievement between charter schools with not-for-profit and for-profit management 
models. Included in the discussion in this chapter is the rationale for using a two-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with moderator variables and covariates.  The chapter 
contains five sections: (a) research questions, (b) participants, (c) instrumentation, (d) 
data collection, and (e) data analysis. 
Research Questions 
The two research questions this study sought to answer were: 
1.  In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth-, eighth-, and 
tenth-grade state English Language Arts (reading) achievement measures vary between 
for-profit and not-for-profit charter schools in Florida? 
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2.  In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth-and eighth-grade 
state mathematics achievement measures vary between for-profit and not-for-profit 
charter schools in Florida? 
Each of these questions was investigated and answered using data that were 
publically available on the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) website (FDOE, 
2016c, 2017a). 
Participants 
The participants in this study were every charter school in Florida that reported 
FSA test results on the Spring 2016 administration of the test.  The participants numbered 
530 reporting charter schools.  121 charter schools did not report data either because they 
tested fewer than 10 students in the reporting grades or for other reasons permitted by 
statute (FDOE, 2016a). 
The entire population of Florida charter schools participated in the study. 
Accordingly, any differences in results from zero were, by definition, “real” differences, 
and results were not interpreted to make inferences about a larger population.  
Regardless, inferential procedures were utilized in an attempt to understand how the 
contextual variables of school cohort size, poverty, minority status, disability status, and 
ELL students affected the differences in achievement levels across the two categories of 
charter schools. Statistical significance values were interpreted as markers for practical 
significance (Bickel, 2007).  Prior research showed that school cohort size, poverty, 
minority status, disabilities, and ELL did have an effect on student achievement (Egalite 




The data used in this study were the results of the 2016 FSA.  The FSA replaced 
the FCAT 2.0 in the 2014-2015 school year (FDOE, 2016a).  The tests in both English 
Language Arts and mathematics were based on the Florida Standards (FDOE, 2017b).  
“The State of Florida’s official source for standards information and course descriptions” 
is known as CPALMS (Florida State University, 2017a).  Every standard for English 
Language Arts and mathematics (as well as many other subjects) can be found on the 
CPALMS website (Florida State University, 2017b). 
There are six strands of English Language Arts standards for Grade 4 that consist 
of (a) language standards, (b) reading standards for informational text, (c) reading 
standards for literature, (d) reading standards foundational skills K-5, (e) standards for 
speaking and listening, and (f) writing standards.  In Grade 8, there are five strands of 
English Language Arts standards that consist of (a) language standards, (b) reading 
standards for informational text, (c) reading standards for literature, (d) standards for 
speaking and listening, and (e) writing standards.  In Grade 10, there are eight strands of 
English Language Arts standards that include (a) language standards, (b) reading 
standards for informational text, (c) reading standards for literacy in history/social studies 
6-12, (d) reading standards for science and technical subjects 6-12, (e) reading standards 
for literature, (f) standards for speaking and listening, and (g) writing standards, and (h) 
writing standards for literacy in history/social studies, science, and technical subjects 
(Florida State University, 2017b). 
In mathematics, there are five strands for fourth grade that include (a) geometry, 
(b) measurement and data, (c) number and operations—fractions, (d) number and 
operations in base 10, and (e) operations and algebraic thinking.  The five strands in 
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mathematics for eighth-grade include (a) expressions and equations, (b) functions, (c) 
geometry, (d) statistics and probability, and (e) the number system (Florida State 
University, 2017b). 
FSA scores for each student have been reported as scale scores; but for schools 
and school districts they are reported as mean scale scores (FDOE, 2016a).  The ELA test 
is described by the FDOE, as follows: 
In grades 4 through 10, the FSA ELA test includes two components, which are 
combined to provide a whole-test FSA ELA scale score:  
1. A text-based Writing component in which students respond to one writing task.  
2. A reading, language, and listening component in which students respond to 
texts and multimedia content (FDOE, 2016e). 
Scale scores are used to enable comparison of scores on different versions of a 
test (Tan & Michel, 2011).  Scale scores make it possible to compare student 
achievement across multiple versions and levels of the FSA (FDOE, 2016f).  Although 
scale scores are reported for the individual student, school scores are mean scale scores 
and are determined by finding the mean of the scale scores for all students who took the 
test at the school level (FDOE, 2016a). 
Reliability and validity of the FSA were also described in detail by the FDOE 
(2016b).  Reliability indicates that multiple administrations of the FSA yield equivalent 
scores.  It refers to “the consistency of test scores” (FDOE, 2016b, p. 2).  The test 
contractor, American Institutes for Research, conducted numerous statistical measures 
and determined that the FSA did produce consistent test scores (FDOE, 2016b). 
Validity refers to the test measuring what it purports to measure.  It becomes a 
professional judgment based on evidence. 
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Supporting a validity argument requires multiple sources of validity evidence. 
This then allows for one to evaluate if sufficient evidence has been presented to 
support the intended uses and interpretations of the test scores. Thus, determining 
the validity of a test first requires an explicit statement regarding the intended 
uses of the test scores, and subsequently, evidence that the scores can be used to 
support these inferences (FDOE, 2016b, p. 6). 
 
The FSA was designed to measure student attainment of the Florida Standards.  
Those standards were the basis for the design of the test (FDOE, 2016a, 2016b, 2016e).  
After examining the content standards, the test specifications, and the internal structure of 
the FSA, the test contractor determined that the FSA was a valid measure of the Florida 
Standards (FDOE, 2016b). 
Evidence of validity was determined using both correlations and confirmatory 
factor analysis.  For both the ELA and mathematics tests, results were correlated across 
the different strands at each test level and were then analyzed using factor analysis and 
goodness-of-fit models.  The goodness-of-fit models used were the root mean square 
error of approximation, the Tucker-Lewis Index, and the comparative fit index.  All of 
these measures indicated that the FSA ELA and mathematics tests were valid instruments 
to measure student attainment of the Florida Standards that the tests were designed to 
measure (FDOE, 2016b). 
Data Collection 
This study used quantitative data (mean scale scores) for each reporting charter 
school in fourth-, eighth-, and tenth-grade ELA and fourth- and eighth-grade mathematics 
on the Spring 2016 administration of the FSA.  The data were publicly available from the 
FDOE.  In addition to test score data, demographic data on the charter schools (also 
publicly available) were obtained to include the charter school’s management model, 
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percentage of students in poverty (as measured by percentage of students participating in 
free and reduced price lunch), percentage of students who were minorities (as measured 
by percentage of students who were non-white), percentage of students who were 
disabled, percentage of students who were ELL, and school cohort size (as measured by 
the reported school population divided by the number of grades served by the school).  
All data were downloaded from the FDOE website (FDOE, 2016c, 2017a).   
The data were entered into a single Excel spreadsheet for ease of analysis.  The 
spreadsheet contained columns for school name, school number (a unique five- or six-
digit number consisting of the one- or two-digit county code immediately followed 
without space by the four-digit, state-issued school code), district name, year opened, 
grade levels authorized, management model, fourth-grade ELA mean scale score, eighth-
grade ELA mean scale score, 10th-grade ELA mean scale score, fourth-grade 
mathematics mean scale score, 10th-grade mathematics mean scale score, number of 
grades the school offered during the 2015-2016 school year, the school cohort size, the 
school population, the school cohort size category (1-41 students – low; 42-90 students – 
medium; 91-445 students – high), percentage of white students, percentage of minority 
students, percentage of disabled students, percentage of ELL students, percentage of non-
ELL students, percentage of students who are in poverty, and percentage of students in 
poverty category (0.0 to 25.9% – low; 26.0 to 62.9% – medium; 63.0 to 100% – 
high).The purpose for creation of categories (high, medium, and low) for school cohort 
size and poverty was to make it possible to effectively use the data as moderator 
variables.  Because school cohort sized ranged between 9 and 445 and poverty ranged 
from zero to 100%, there was an excessive number of categories in the calculation, 
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resulting in a large number of degrees of freedom.  This skewed the results and made 
them less meaningful.  Also, ANCOVA assumes roughly equal size groups.  
Accordingly, the categories were created to contain approximately equal numbers of 
cases so the ANCOVA results would be more meaningful and the data would meet the 
ANCOVA assumption of group equality. The spread sheet was then imported into the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 23) for analysis.  Creating the two 
categorical groups made it possible to effectively analyze the moderator variables. 
Data Analysis 
A simple way to analyze the data would be to run an independent samples t-test to 
compare results for the two groups of charter schools and test for significance.  Although 
this would yield appropriate results, it would not allow for a closer examination of some 
relevant school characteristics that might have influenced those results.  Specifically, 
using a t-test alone would not permit analysis of the effects of school cohort size, poverty, 
minority status, disabilities, and ELL on the data.  Accordingly, a stronger analysis model 
was selected to not only observe variance between student achievement in charter school 
management models, but to examine more closely those factors including school cohort 
size, poverty, ELL status, disability status, and minority status and how they influenced 
achievement in charter schools. 
Using SPSS 23, a two-way ANCOVA (a factorial analysis) was performed on the 
data using the school cohort size category and the poverty category as the moderator 
variables and the ELL, disability, and minority percentages as the covariates.  The 
moderator variables were each run independently along with the covariate data to analyze 
each of the dependent variables.  ANCOVA is a combination of analysis of variance and 
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regression analysis.  ANCOVA “can be discussed as…an extension of analysis of 
variance” (Wildt & Ahtola, 1978, p. 8).  Because each charter school had differences in 
school cohort size, poverty, racial composition, students with disabilities and students 
who were ELL, ANCOVA was an appropriate test.  ANCOVA “provides a means to 
statistically adjust the dependent variable for these preexisting differences” (Widlt & 
Ahtola, 1978, p. 17). 
The variables for analysis are presented in Table 1.  Table 1 illustrates the 10 
groups of variables (i.e., the five dependent variables paired with each of the two 
different moderator variables and the same three covariates that were examined).  To 
determine the effect size, a partial Eta squared was calculated for each of the 10 variable 
groups.  The results for each of these analyses including effect sizes are presented in 10 













































































Note.  ELA = English Language Arts; ELL = English language learners 
 
 
For each of the five major groups of data (1) fourth-grade ELA, (2) fourth-grade 
mathematics, (3) eighth-grade ELA, (4) eighth-grade mathematics, and (5) 10th-grade 
ELA, descriptive statistics including the number of cases in each group, the mean, the 
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minimum, the maximum, and the standard deviation of the mean scale scores on the 2016 
FSA were reported.  Those data served to summarize the central tendency and 
distribution of the population.  The mean as a measure of central tendency is the central 
point around which the test scores cluster.  The standard deviation shows the dispersion 
or “the average distance from the mean” for those scores (Steinberg, 2011, p. 507). 
Summary 
This chapter explained how the study was completed to answer the two research 
questions.  The research questions examined student achievement in charter schools as 
measured on the 2016 FSA ELA in Grades 4, 8, and 10, and in mathematics in Grades 4 
and 8 to determine if their management model (not-for-profit or for-profit) affected the 
schools’ performance.  The participants were identified and consisted of the population of 
reporting charter schools on the selected grade levels and tests of the 2016 FSA.  The 
instrumentation was reviewed, including the validity and reliability of the testing 
instrument.  The method for data collection was described along with the analysis used to 






This study was designed to examine student achievement in charter schools, with 
an explicit focus on disclosing differences based on the school’s management model (for- 
profit or not-for-profit) while factoring in the effects of the school’s poverty, cohort size, 
minority, disability, and ELL composition.  The chapter contains three sections: (a) 
descriptive statistics, (b) ANCOVA results for the research questions, and (c) summary. 
This chapter presents the results of the analyses, using data disaggregated by grade level 
and subject, performed to respond to the following two research questions which guided 
the study.   
1.  In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth-, eighth-, and 
tenth-grade state English Language Arts (reading) achievement measures vary between 
for-profit and not-for-profit charter schools in Florida? 
2.  In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth-and eighth-grade 
state mathematics achievement measures vary between for-profit and not-for-profit 
charter schools in Florida? 
Descriptive Statistics 
Although the study’s population consisted of all 530 charter schools that reported 
scores on the 2016 FSA in fourth-grade ELA and mathematics, eighth-grade ELA and 
mathematics, and 10th-grade ELA, the results are reported by grade level and subject.  
For fourth-grade ELA, 320 schools reported results.  Of those 320 schools, 166 were 
managed by not-for-profit management entities, and 154 were managed by for-profit 
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management entities.  The mean scale score for all charter schools on the fourth-grade 
FSA ELA test in 2016 was 310.92.  For the not-for-profit schools, the mean scale score 
was 311.11, and for the for-profit schools, the mean scale score was 310.72.  Overall, 
fourth-grade ELA mean scale scores ranged from 268 to 333.  The not-for-profit schools 
scored between 268 and 333, and the for-profit schools scored between 277 and 330.  The 
overall standard deviation was 10.45.  The not-for-profit schools had a standard deviation 
of 11.52, and the for-profit schools had a standard deviation of 9.19.  The results for 

















Not-for-Profit 166 311.11 11.52 268 333 
For-Profit 154 310.72   9.19 277 330 




For eighth-grade ELA, 252 schools reported results.  Of those, 120 were managed 
by not-for-profit management entities, and 132 were managed by for-profit management 
entities.  The mean scale score for all charter schools on the eighth-grade FSA ELA test 
in 2016 was 341.11.  For the not-for-profit schools the mean scale score was 341.42, and 
for the for-profit schools, the mean scale score was 340.84.  Overall, eighth-grade ELA 
mean scale scores ranged from 298 to 370.  The not-for-profit schools scored between 
298 and 365, and the for-profit schools scored between 310 and 370.  The overall 
standard deviation was 11.29.  The not-for-profit schools had a standard deviation of 
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12.63, and the for-profit schools had a standard deviation of 9.96.  The results for eighth-

















Not-for-Profit 120 341.42 12.63 298 365 
For-Profit 132 340.84   9.96 310 370 
All Schools 252 341.11 11.29 298 370 
 
For 10th-grade ELA, 121 schools reported results.  Of those, 53 were managed by 
not-for-profit management entities and 68 were managed by for-profit management 
entities.  The mean scale score for all charter schools on the 10th-grade FSA ELA test in 
2016 was 345.02.  For the not-for-profit schools the mean scale score was 350.25; for the 
for-profit schools, the mean scale score was 340.94.  Overall, eighth-grade ELA mean 
scale scores ranged from 311 to 375.  The not-for-profit schools scored between 315 and 
375, and the for-profit schools scored between 311 and 370.  The overall standard 
deviation was 15.83.  The not-for-profit schools had a standard deviation of 14.35, and 
the-for profit schools had a standard deviation of 15.82.  The results for eighth-grade 
ELA are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
 













Not-for-Profit 53 350.25 14.35 315 375 
For-Profit 68 340.94 15.82 311 370 





For fourth-grade mathematics, 319 schools reported results.  Of those 319 
schools, 166 were managed by not-for-profit management entities, and 153 were 
managed by for-profit management entities.  The mean scale score for all charter schools 
on the fourth-grade FSA mathematics test in 2016 was 313.28.  For the not-for-profit 
schools, the mean scale score was 313.16, and for the for-profit schools,the mean scale 
score was 313.42.  Overall, fourth-grade mathematics mean scale scores ranged from 268 
to 345.  The not-for-profit schools scored between 268 and 345, and the for-profit schools 
scored between 273 and 338.  The overall standard deviation was 12.26.  The not-for-
profit schools had a standard deviation of 13.06, and the-for profit schools had a standard 

















Not-for-Profit 166 313.16 13.06 268 345 
For-Profit 153 313.42 11.37 273 338 
All Schools 319 313.28 12.26 268 345 
 
For eighth-grade mathematics, 235 schools reported results.  Of those 235 
schools, 114 were managed by not-for-profit management entities and 121 were managed 
by for-profit management entities.  The mean scale score for all charter schools on the 
eighth-grade FSA mathematics test in 2016 was 336.62.  For the not-for-profit schools, 
the mean scale score was 338.19, and for the for-profit schools, the mean scale score was 
335.14.  Overall, eighth-grade mathematics mean scale scores ranged from 296 to 378.  
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The not-for-profit schools scored between 296 and 378, and the for-profit schools scored 
between 306 and 371.  The overall standard deviation was 13.85.  The not-for-profit 
schools had a standard deviation of 15.43, and the-for profit schools had a standard 

















Not-for-Profit 114 338.19 15.43 296 378 
For-Profit 121 335.14 12.04 306 371 
All Schools 235 336.62 13.85 296 378 
 
Descriptive statistics for the moderator variables and the covariates are compiled 
for all of the 530 charter schools in the population.  The moderator variables were school 
cohort size and poverty.  For the school cohort size (the total school population divided 
by the number of grades in the school) the mean was 83.79, the standard deviation was 
69.85, and the range was 9 to 445.  For poverty level (the percent of students on free and 
reduced lunch) the mean percentage was 45.92, the standard deviation was 29.86, and the 
range was 0 to 100 percent.   
The covariates were percent of minority students, percent of disabled students, 
and percent of English language learners.  For minority students the mean was 66.07 
percent, the standard deviation was 28.24, and the range was 2.60 percent to 100 percent.  
For disabled students, the mean was 9.22 percent, the standard deviation was 9.78, and 
the range was from 0 percent to 100 percent.  For English language learners, the mean 
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was 9.11 percent, the standard deviation was 11.46, and the range was 0 percent to 80.70 
percent. 
ANCOVA Results for the Research Questions 
Research Question 1 
In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth, eighth, and tenth-grade 
state English Language Arts (reading) achievement measures vary between for-profit and 
not-for-profit charter schools in Florida? 
 
The mean scale scores on the 2016 FSA fourth, eighth, and 10th-grade ELA for 
each charter school were compared using a two-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).  
Covariates and moderator variables were included in the study to control for their 
influence on student achievement and to investigate the possibility of interaction effects 
influencing student achievement.  Each school’s cohort size (expressed as total school 
enrollment divided by the number of grades in the school) and poverty level (expressed 
as the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch), were the moderator 
variables.  Each school’s racial composition (expressed as the percentage of minority 
students), disabled students (expressed as the percentage of students with disabilities), 
and English Language Learners (expressed as the percentage of English Language 
Learners) were factored in as covariate variables. 
As presented in the previous section of this chapter in Tables 2 through 6, the not-
for-profit charter schools had higher mean scale scores than the for-profit charter schools 
with the exception of fourth-grade mathematics.  To determine the significance of those 
differences and to see if the moderator variables or the covariates had an influence on the 
outcome, an ANCOVA was run using SPSS 23.  Effect size was calculated by utilizing 
partial Eta squared results.  Tabachnick & Fidell (1989) defined partial Eta squared 
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differences as small if .01-.08; medium as .09 to .24; and large as .25 or more.  Effect size 
is used to determine if the statistically significant difference is a “meaningful” difference 
(Steinberg, 2011, p. 395).  The interaction effect occurs “when one independent variable 
has a significant effect on the dependent variable, but only under certain levels or 
conditions of the other independent variable” (Steinberg, 2011, p. 339).  In this study, 
interaction effects could occur between poverty or the school cohort size on the 
management model. 
Table 7 presents the results for fourth-grade ELA with school cohort size as the 
moderator variable.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 319)=2.08, p=.150, or the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and the school cohort size, F(2, 319)=0.39, 
p=.674, and ELL status, F(1, 319)=0.05, p=.821 have more than five chances in 100 that 
they are due to mere chance, and, therefore were not significant.  The minority status, 
F(1, 319)=53.93, p=<.001, the disability status, F(1,319)=147.82, p=<.001, and the 
school cohort size, F(2, 319)=8.87, p=<.001 have less than one chance in 100 that the 
results are due to mere chance and, therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, and school cohort size.  For minority status, 
partial Eta squared was .15, a medium effect size; for disability status it was .32, a large 

























Minority 1 3375.97   53.93 .000 .15 
Disability 1 9252.55 147.82 .000 .32 
ELL 1       3.20     0.05 .821 .00 
Management  
Model 
1   130.46     2.08 .150 .01 




2     24.75     0.39 .674 .00 
 
The results for fourth-grade ELA with poverty as the moderator variable are 
presented in Table 8.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 319)=2.73, p= .099, or the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and poverty, F(2, 319) =2.05, p=.130 and 
ELL status, F(1, 319) =2.28, p=.132 have more than five chances in 100 that they are due 
to mere chance, and therefore were not significant.  The minority status, F(1, 319) 
=28.14, p=<.001, the disability status, F(1, 319) =182.17, p=<.001, and poverty, F(2, 
319) =27.27, p=<.001 have less than one chance in 100 that the results are due to mere 
chance and therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, and poverty.  For minority status, partial Eta 
squared was .08, a small effect size; for disability status it was .37, a large effect size; and 
























Minority      1   1573.67   28.14 .000 .08 
Disability 1 10186.93 182.17 .000 .37 
ELL 1     127.68     2.28 .132 .01 
Management 
  Model 
1     152.88 
 
    2.73 .099 .01 
Poverty 2   1524.85   27.27 .000 .15 
Management 
  Model*Poverty 




Table 9 presents the results for eighth-grade ELA with school cohort size as the 
moderator variable.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 251) =2.58, p=.110, or the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and the school cohort size, F(2, 251) =0.48, 
p=.616 have more than five chances in 100 that they are due to mere chance, and 
therefore were not significant.  The minority status, F(1, 251) =8.76, p=.003, the 
disability status, F(1, 251) =71.10, p=<.001, the ELL status F(1, 251) =5.72, p=.017, and 
the school cohort size F(2, 251) =4.62, p=.011 have less than two chances in 100 that the 
results are due to mere chance and, therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, ELL, and school cohort size.  For minority 
status, partial Eta squared was .04, a large effect size; for disability status it was .23, a 
medium effect size; for ELL it was .02, a small effect size; and for school cohort size it 























Minority 1   782.44   8.77 .003 .04 
Disability 1 6346.62 71.10 .000 .23 
ELL 1   510.95   5.72 .017 .02 
Management  
Model 
1   230.29   2.58 .110 .01 




2     43.29   0.48 .616 .00 
   
The results for eighth-grade ELA with poverty as the moderator variable are 
presented in Table 10.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 251) =2.56, p= .111, or the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and poverty, F(2, 251) =2.52, p=.083, 
minority status, F(1, 251) =2.40, p=.123 and ELL, F(1, 251) =1.93, p=.166 have more 
than five chances in 100 that they are due to mere chance, and therefore were not 
significant.  The disability status, F(1, 251) =87.70, p=<.001 and poverty, F(2, 251) 
=9.33, p=<.001 have less than one chance in 100 that the results are due to mere chance 
and, therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, disability status, and poverty.  For disability status, partial Eta squared was .27, a 
























Minority 1   204.23   2.40 .123 .01 
Disability 1 7459.42 87.70 .000 .27 
ELL 1    164.30   1.93 .166 .01 
Management 
  Model 
1   217.68   2.56 .111 .01 
Poverty 2   793.13   9.33 .000 .07 
Management 
  Model*Poverty 




Table 11 presents the results for 10th-grade ELA with school cohort size as the 
moderator variable.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 120) =3.50, p=.064, and the school cohort size, F(2, 120) 
=1.45, p=.238 have more than five chances in 100 that they are due to mere chance, and 
therefore were not significant.  The minority status, F(1, 120) =9.68, p=.002, the 
disability status, F(1, 120) =41.41, p=<.001, the ELL status F(1, 120) =4.23, p=.042, and 
the interaction effect, that is the interaction between the management model and the 
school cohort size, F(2, 120) =5.56, p=.005 have less than five chances in 100 that the 
results are due to mere chance and, therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, ELL, and management model combined with 
school cohort size.  For minority status, partial Eta squared was .08, a small effect size; 
for disability status it was .27, a large effect size; for ELL it was .04, a small effect size; 
and for the interaction effect or the management model combined with school cohort size, 























Minority 1 1355.38   9.68 .002 .08 
Disability 1 5796.89 41.41 .000 .27 
ELL 1   591.66   4.23 .042 .04 
Management  
Model 
1   489.95   3.50 .064 .03 








A plot of the interaction effect of the management model and the school cohort 
size is depicted in Figure 1 which shows that for-profit charter schools had higher mean 
scale scores when the school cohort class was small.  However, when the school cohort 








Figure 1.  Grade 10 English Language Arts (ELA):  Interaction effect between 
management model and school cohort size 
 
The results for 10th-grade ELA with poverty as the moderator variable are 
presented in Table 12.  Those results show that the difference in scores between poverty 
alone, F(2, 120) =0.731, p=.484 has more than five chances in 100 that it is due to mere 
chance, and therefore was not significant.  The minority status, F(1, 120) =4.131, p=.044, 
disability status, F(1, 120) =43.959, p=<.001, ELL, F(1, 120) =4.54 p=.035, the 
management model, F(1, 120) =5.42, p=.022, and the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and poverty,  F(2, 120) =3.66, p=.029 have 
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less than one chance in 100 that the results are due to mere chance and therefore, were 
significant. 
The main effect, that is the effect of the management model, demonstrated a 
statistically significant difference between not-for-profit and for-profit charter schools.  
As presented in Table 4, the mean scale score of not-for-profit charter schools was 
350.24, and the mean scale score of for-profit charter schools was 340.94. 
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, ELL, management model, and management 
model combined with poverty.  For minority status, partial Eta squared was.04, a small 
effect size; for disability status it was .28, a large effect size; for ELL it was .04, a small 
effect size; for the management model it was .05, a small effect size; and for the 
interaction effect or the management model combined with poverty it was .06, a small 
effect size.   
Table 12 
 



















Minority 1   613.78   4.13 .044 .04 
Disability 1 6531.36 43.96 .000 .28 
ELL 1   674.60   4.54 .035 .04 
Management 
  Model 
1   805.36   5.42 .022 .05 
Poverty 2   108.59   0.73 .484 .01 
Management 
  Model*Poverty 
2   543.21   3.66 .029 .06 
 
A plot of the interaction effect of the management model and poverty is depicted 
in Figure 2 which shows that not-for-profit profit charter schools have higher mean scale 
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scores when poverty is low or medium.  However, when poverty is high, the for-profit 
charter schools have higher mean scale scores. 
 
 
Figure 2. Grade 10 English Language Arts (ELA):  Interaction effect between 
management model and school poverty. 
Research Question 2 
In what ways and to what extent does performance on fourth and eighth-grade state 
mathematics achievement measures vary between for-profit and not-for-profit charter 
schools in Florida? 
 
Each school’s cohort size (expressed as total school enrollment divided by the 
number of grades in the school) and poverty level (expressed as the percentage of 
students eligible for free and reduced lunch), were the moderator variables.  Each 
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school’s racial composition (expressed as the percentage of minority students), disabled 
students (expressed as the percentage of students with disabilities), and English Language 
Learners (expressed as the percentage of English Language Learners) were factored in as 
covariate variables. 
Table 13 presents the results for fourth grade mathematics with school cohort size 
as the moderator variable.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 318) =0.64, p=.425, the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and school cohort size, F(2, 318) =51.90, 
p=.619, and ELL status, F(1, 318) =0.09, p=.761 have more than five chances in 100 that 
they are due to mere chance, and therefore were not significant.  The minority status, F(1, 
318) =34.54, p=<.001, the disability status, F(1, 318) =46.18, p=<.001, and the school 
cohort size, F(2, 318) =14.78 p=<.001 have less than one chance in 100 that the results 
are due to mere chance and, therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, and school cohort size.  For minority status, 
partial Eta squared was .10, a medium effect size, for disability status it was .13, a 




























Minority 1 3731.71 34.54 .000 .100 
Disability 1 4990.15 46.18 .000 .130 
ELL 1     10.04   0.09 .761 .000 
Management  
Model 
1     68.87   0.64 .425 .002 








The results for fourth grade mathematics with poverty as the moderator variable 
are presented in Table 14.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
management model alone, F(1, 318) =0.06, p=.806, the interaction effect, that is the 
interaction between the management model and poverty, F(2, 318) =1.40, p=.249, and 
ELL, F(1, 318) =3.60, p=.059 have more than five chances in 100 that they are due to 
mere chance, and therefore were not significant.  The minority status, F(1, 318) =17.35, 
p=<.001, the disability status, F(1, 318) =54.67, p=<.001, and poverty, F(2, 318) =17.27, 
p=<.001 have less than one chance in 100 that the results are due to mere chance and 
therefore, were significant.   
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, and poverty.  For minority status, partial Eta 
squared was .05, a small effect size; for disability status it was .15, a medium effect size; 
























Minority 1 1836.14 17.35 .000 .05 
Disability 1 5786.95 54.67 .000 .15 
ELL 1   380.74   3.60 .059 .01 
Management 
  Model 
1       6.37   0.06 .806 .00 
Poverty 2 1827.63 17.27 .000 .10 
Management 
  Model*Poverty 




Table 15 presents the results for eighth-grade mathematics with school cohort size 
as the moderator variable.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
interaction effect, that is the interaction between the management model and the school 
cohort size, F(2, 234) =0.81, p=.447, and ELL, F(1, 234) =0.30 p=.582 have more than 
five chances in 100 that they are due to mere chance, and therefore were not significant.  
The minority status, F(1,234) =11.78, p=.001, the disability status, F(1, 234) =36.44, 
p=<.001, the main effect, or the effect of the management model F(1, 234) =8.06, p=.005, 
and the school cohort size F(2, 234) =10.56, p=<.001 have less than one chance in 100 
that the results are due to mere chance and, therefore, were significant.   
The main effect, that is the effect of the management model, demonstrated a 
statistically significant difference between not-for-profit and for-profit charter schools.  
As presented in Table 6, the mean scale score of not-for-profit charter schools was 
338.19, and the mean scale score of for-profit charter schools was 335.14. 
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, management model, and school cohort size.  For 
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minority status, partial Eta squared was .05, a small effect size; for disability status it was 
.14, a medium effect size; for the management model it was .03, a small effect size; and 
for school cohort size it was .08, a small effect size.   
Table 15 
 



















Minority 1 1685.92 11.78 .001 .05 
Disability 1 5215.80 36.44 .000 .14 
ELL 1     43.39   0.30 .582 .00 
Management  
Model 
1 1153.48   8.06 .005 .03 








The results for eighth-grade mathematics with poverty as the moderator variable 
are presented in Table 16.  Those results show that the differences in scores between the 
interaction effect, that is the interaction between the management model and poverty,  
F(2, 234) =0.67, p=.513, and ELL, F(1, 234) =0.71, p=.401 have more than five chances 
in 100 that they are due to mere chance, and therefore were not significant.  The minority 
status, F(1, 234) =5.77, p=.017, disability status, F(1, 234) =49.46, p=<.001, management 
model, F(1, 234) =4.80, p=.030, and poverty, F(2, 234) =3.60, p=.029, have less than five 
chances in 100 that the results are due to mere chance and, therefore, were significant. 
The main effect, that is the effect of the management model, demonstrated a 
statistically significant difference between not-for-profit and for-profit charter schools.  
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As presented in Table 6, the mean scale score of not-for-profit charter schools was 
338.19, and the mean scale score of for profit charter schools was 335.14. 
The test for effect size, partial Eta squared, was considered only for the significant 
results, minority status, disability status, management model, and poverty.  For minority 
status, partial Eta squared was .02, a small effect size; for disability status it was .18, a 
medium effect size; for the management model it was .02, a small effect size; and for 
poverty it was .03, a small effect size.  
Table 16 
 



















Minority 1   872.42   5.77 .017 .02 
Disability 1 7477.76 49.46 .000 .18 
ELL 1   107.17   0.71 .401 .00 
Management 
  Model 
1   725.21   4.80 .030 .02 
Poverty 2   544.58   3.60 .029 .03 
Management 
  Model*Poverty 
2   101.25   0.67 .513 .01 
 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the results of the investigation into differences in Florida 
charter school student achievement on the fourth-, eighth-, and 10th-grade 2016 FSA 
based on the charter school management model (for-profit or not-for-profit).The results 
indicated that differences in achievement levels between for-profit and not-for-profit 
schools were statistically significant for only three of 10 achievement measures.  In 
contrast, the covariates were more often statistically significant in explaining the score 
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differences between the for-profit and the not-for-profit charter schools.  The researcher 
also investigated the influence of moderator variables (school cohort size and poverty) 
along with the covariates of minority status, disability status, and ELL status. 
Table 17 summarizes all categories where there were significant findings.  With 
the exception of eighth-grade mathematics with the school cohort size and poverty 
moderator variables, and 10th-grade ELA with the poverty moderator variable, the 
charter school’s management model did not have a statistically significant impact on 
student achievement.  School cohort size was statistically significant in fourth and eighth-
grade ELA and mathematics, and poverty was statistically significant in fourth- and 
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The main effect, that is the effect of the management model (for-profit or not-for-
profit) having an effect on the mean scale scores was only significant in 10th-grade ELA 
with poverty as the moderator variable and in eighth-grade mathematics with both school 
cohort size and poverty as the moderator variables.  The interaction of the management 
model and the school cohort size as well as the interaction of the management model and 
poverty were statistically significant only for 10th-grade ELA.  Disability status was 
statistically significant across all grades and subjects.  Minority status was statistically 
significant in all grades and subjects except for eighth-grade ELA, and ELL was 
statistically significant in eighth-grade ELA with both school cohort size and poverty 
moderators and in 10th-grade ELA with poverty moderators.  That means the covariates 
did account for some of the variance in a statistically significant way. 
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of these findings, considering how findings align 
with the extant literature and the relevant policy contexts, offering recommendations for 






The results of the study were presented and analyzed in Chapter 4.  This chapter 
contains a summary of the investigation, a discussion on the implications for practice, 
and recommendations for future researchers.  The chapter contains three sections: (a) 
discussion of the findings and alignment with extant literature, (b) recommendations for 
practice, and (c) recommendations for further research. 
Discussion of the Findings and Alignment with Extant Literature 
The study was designed to investigate student achievement in Florida charter 
schools to determine if there were statistically significant differences attributable to the 
school’s management model (for-profit or not-for-profit).  To more fully specify the 
model and strengthen the study, moderator variables of school cohort size and poverty, 
and covariates of minority percentage, disability percentage, and percentage of English 
language learners were included.  The instrument used was the 2016 FSA in fourth-, 
eighth-, and 10th-grade ELA, and fourth-and eighth-grade mathematics.  The population 
consisted of all 530 charter schools that reported 2016 FSA results. 
Main Effects 
The primary purpose of this study was to compare differences in student 
achievement in Florida charter schools based on the school’s management model – either 
for-profit or not-for-profit.  In only three instances did the management model yield 
statistically significant differences in student achievement.  Tenth-grade ELA with 
poverty as the moderator variable was statistically significant with not-for-profit schools 
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(mean scale score of 350.25) performing better than for-profit schools (mean scale score 
of 340.94).  Eighth-grade mathematics with both school cohort size and poverty as the 
moderator variables were significant with not-for-profit schools (mean scale score 
338.19), performing better than for-profit schools (mean scale score 335.14). 
Generally, these findings concur with the research reviewed in Chapter 2.  Sass 
(2006) who studied charter schools in Florida, found that the charter school management 
model did not show any impact on student achievement.  He wrote, “Management 
structure appears to have no impact on student achievement in charter schools; charters 
managed by for-profit firms perform the same as those operated by nonprofit entities” (p. 
119). 
Peterson and Chingos (2009), who investigated student achievement in the 
Philadelphia Public Schools, found no significant differences in reading but did find a 
significant difference in mathematics.  That finding is similar to the finding in this 
research in eighth-grade mathematics.  The major difference between Peterson and 
Chingos’ (2009) findings and the present study was that their study was limited to the 
lowest 46 performing elementary and middle schools in Philadelphia between 2002 and 
2008, but in this study, the researcher investigated all 530 charter schools in Florida using 
spring 2016 FSA test results.  Additionally, Peterson and Chingos (2009) cautioned 
against making generalizations from their findings because the not-for-profit EMOs in 
Philadelphia “seem to have been selected as much for their strong political base as for 
any history of effectiveness at delivering educational services” (pp. 27-28). 
Garcia et al. (2009) in their Arizona charter school study, also concluded that 
there was no difference in student achievement based on management alone.  Only by 
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analyzing subtests were Garcia et al. (2009) able to find a small, statistically-positive 
effect in vocabulary while also finding a small, statistically-negative effect in reading 
comprehension.  They attributed those differences to techniques for-profit EMOs use to 
enforce a highly-structured curriculum that favors basic skills over critical thinking skills. 
Although not statistically significant, differences identified in the current study 
showed that not-for-profit charter schools had higher mean scale scores in fourth-grade 
mathematics (311.11 as compared with 310.72) and eighth-grade ELA (341.42 as 
compared with 340.84), as well as with the statistically significant scores in eighth-grade 
mathematics (338.19 as compared with 335.14) and 10th-grade ELA (350.25 as 
compared with 340.94).  Only in fourth-grade mathematics (313.16 as compared with 
313.42) did for-profit charter schools have higher mean scale scores on the 2016 FSA. 
Accordingly, there did not appear to be an overarching statistical difference 
between for-profit and not-for-profit charter schools in Florida based on the 2016 
administration of the FSA. 
Interaction Effects 
Interaction effects occur “when one independent variable has a significant effect 
on the dependent variable, but only under certain levels or conditions of the other 
independent variable” (Steinberg, 2011, p. 339).  In this study, interaction effects could 
occur between poverty and the management model or between the school cohort size and 
the management model.  As depicted in Figures 1 and 2, interaction effects occurred only 
for 10th-grade ELA with both school cohort size and poverty. 
When the school cohort size was low (1-41 students per grade), for-profit charter 
schools had higher estimated marginal means (approximately 347.5 as compared to 
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approximately 342.5) than not-for-profit charter schools.  When the school cohort size 
was medium (42-90 students per grade), not-for-profit schools had higher estimated 
marginal means (approximately 350.0 as compared to 337.5) than for-profit schools.  As 
the school cohort size rose to high (91-445 students per grade), the not-for-profit charter 
schools had higher estimated marginal means (approximately 350.5 as compared to 
approximately 345.0) than for for-profit schools.   
When poverty was low (0-25.9% students on free or reduced price lunch), not-for-
profit charter schools had higher estimated marginal means (approximately 353 as 
compared to approximately 338) than for-profit charter schools.  When poverty was 
medium (26.0-62.9% students on free or reduced price lunch), not-for-profit schools had 
higher estimated marginal means (approximately 348 as compared to 344) than for-profit 
schools.  As poverty rose to high (63.0-100% students on free or reduced price lunch), the 
for-profit charter schools had higher estimated marginal means (approximately 343 as 
compared to approximately 342) than not-for-profit schools.   
The review of literature related to charter school management models and student 
achievement yielded no information on the influence of school cohort size or poverty on 
student achievement measures.  However, the literature comparing charter schools and 
traditional public schools shed some light on the interaction effects found in this study. 
In reviewing the results of poverty, the researcher found higher marginal mean 
scores with for-profit schools when poverty was high.  Thus, the for-profit schools 
outperformed the not-for-profit schools when they served populations where there was 
greater poverty.  These results are similar to the results found by the Center for Research 
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on Education Outcomes (2013); Clark et al. (2015); DiCarlo (2011); Finn et al. (2016); 
and Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (2005b). 
The review of literature using smaller school class size (school cohort size) as a 
factor also revealed that when charter schools had smaller classes, they outperformed 
traditional public schools (Hassell et al., 2006).  This comports with the findings in the 
present study regarding student achievement and school cohort size. 
Covariates 
This study included three covariates: (a) minority—defined as the percentage of 
students who were not White, (b) disability—defined as the percentage of students with 
disabilities, and (c) ELL—defined as percentage of students who were English Language 
Learners.  Analysis of the data revealed that minority status had a statistically significant 
influence and accounted for some of the variance in each of the 10 subject and moderator 
variable combinations except for eighth-grade mathematics with poverty.  Disability 
status was statistically significant and accounted for some of the variance in each of the 
10 subject and moderator variable combinations.  ELL had a statistically significant 
influence and accounted for some of the variance only in eighth-grade ELA with school 
cohort size as the moderator variable and in 10th-grade ELA with both school cohort size 
and poverty as the moderator variables. 
Minority status influencing student achievement comports with prior research 
(Egalite & Kisida, 2016; Johnson et al., 2016; Lee & Loeb, 2000; Murphy, 2010; White 
et al., 2016).  Students with disabilities have been found to affect charter school 
achievement negatively (Sass, 2016).  ELL significance appears to be reasonable, as 
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students for whom English is a second language can be expected to have difficulty with 
ELA examinations. 
Implications for Practice 
As expressed in Chapter 2 of this study, when charter schools were proposed, 
their advocates had many dreams for the influence they would exert on the educational 
marketplace, including traditional public schools.  Among the expectations for charters 
was the development of specialized schools to offer curricula not available or not stressed 
in the traditional school, empowering parents and educators to operate the school, 
creating more options for students, encouraging traditional public schools to meet the 
higher educational accomplishments of charter schools, developing innovative 
approaches to education, and overall, providing for better student achievement results 
(Crew & Anderson, 2003; Finn et al., 2000, 2016).  Those promises, for the most part, 
have not been fulfilled. 
The stated purpose of this study was to help guide legislators and others in 
strengthening the charter school program to assure that public funds for education are 
spent on student educational needs and not on the profitability of unsuccessful for-profit 
EMOs.  The results confirmed that in Florida, there was little to no benefit to students 
from for-profit charter schools.  The extant literature documents mixed results between 
charter schools and traditional public schools (Bettinger, 2005; Betts & Tang, 2011; 
Bifulco & Ladd, 2004; Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2013; Clark, 2015;  
Crew & Anderson, 2003; DiCarlo, 2011; May, 2006; Hassel, Terrell, & Kowal, 2006; 
Miron & Nelson, 2001; Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability, 2005b; Sass, 2006; Silverman, 2012; Zimmer, et al., 2012).  Many for-
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profit charter schools were no better than traditional public schools and, in some 
instances, were worse—10th-grade ELA with poverty as the moderator variable, and 
eighth-grade mathematics with both school cohort size and poverty as the moderator 
variables—than the not-for-profit charter schools. 
These results, therefore, raise several practice-related issues.  First, if there is no 
difference in student achievement between for-profit charter schools, not-for-profit 
charter schools, and traditional public schools, perhaps for-profit entities should not be 
permitted to take monies from the public schools in order to enrich their investors at the 
expense of the nation’s school children without delivering better results. 
Second, some for-profit entities provide similar results to traditional public 
schools while using some of their per-pupil income to provide profits to their investors.  
Perhaps, public school officials should learn from these for-profit charter schools how 
public schools could reduce their traditional expenses or, in the alternative, improve 
teaching methods in the traditional public schools. 
Lastly, some charter schools do outperform their traditional public school peers.  
There may be strategies or methods that might be replicated in other schools to improve 
student performance, and those should be shared with the entire education community.  If 
there are no benefits that are derived from siphoning much needed funding from 
traditional public schools to charter schools, perhaps the charter school program should 
be reviewed in its entirety to find additional ways to enable parental choice and 




Recommendations for Further Research 
This study provides a basis for annual, or at the very least, biennial research to 
compare the effects of charter school management models on student achievement.  Such 
information would yield data, on the progress being made by charter schools, based on 
their management models, to fulfill their promise of providing a superior education .  It 
would also enable policy makers to monitor the effectiveness of for-profit charter schools 
as compared to not-for-profit charter schools, and potentially, to investigate the 
effectiveness of charter schools generally, in Florida. 
Investigating more thoroughly the covariate effects used in this study is another 
potential area of research.  Although the researcher in the current study did not analyze 
the effects of minorities, disabilities, and ELL on the outcomes, other than to 
acknowledge their accounting for some of the variance, knowing the direction of their 
influence and how they affect student achievement would yield potentially useful 
information. 
Research into how charter schools actually compare with Florida’s traditional 
public schools would better inform decision makers as to the true effects of charter 
schools on the educational scene in the state.  Should those results show little or a 
negative difference between charter and traditional schools, serious debate would need to 
occur to determine the future of charter schools in Florida. 
Finally, some charter schools perform exceptionally well while others fare poorly.  
A study of high-achievement charter school achievement to determine what the 
exceptional schools do differently than the lower-performing charter schools would help 
shed light on ways to raise the educational performance of all charter schools. 
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Summary 
In this study, using a two-way ANCOVA, the researcher found limited 
statistically significant differences in student achievement on fourth-, eighth-, and 10th-
grade ELA and in fourth- and eighth-grade mathematics as measured by the 2016 
administration of the FSA.  Only 10th-grade ELA with poverty and eighth-grade 
mathematics with poverty and school cohort size had statistically significant differences 
favoring not-for-profit charter schools.  Interaction effects were found to be statistically 
significant for 10th-grade ELA with both school cohort size and poverty as the moderator 
variables.  When the school cohort size was low or poverty was high, for-profit charter 
schools outperformed not-for-profit charter schools.  In every other case, not-for-profit 
charter schools outperformed their for-profit peers.  Finally, the covariates of percentage 
of minority students, percentage of disabled students, and percentage of ELLs explained 
some of the variation in the differences in student achievement. 
Recommendations for practice including more stringent review of the role of for- 
profit charter schools as well as increased exchange of best practices between charter 
schools and traditional public schools were made.  Recommendations for future research 
included more study of the direction of the covariates used as well as regular updating of 
this research.  The research found, as did prior researchers that, in a general sense, there 










LIST OF REFERENCES 
Baker, B., & Miron, G. (2015). The business of charter schooling: Understanding the 
policies that charter operators use for financial benefit. Retrieved from National 
Education Policy Center website: http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/charter-
revenue 
 
Berends, M. (2004). In the wake of A Nation at Risk: New American schools’ private 
sector school reform initiative. Peabody Journal of Education 79(1), 130-163. 
 
Bettinger, E. P. (2005). The effect of charter schools on charter students and public 
schools. Economics of Education Review 24, 133-147. 
 
Betts, J. R., & Tang, Y. E. (2011). The effect of charter schools on student achievement: 
A meta-analysis of the literature. National Charter School Research Project.  
Retrieved from http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED526353.pdf 
 
Bickel, R. (2007). Multilevel analysis for applied research: It’s just regression! 
Methodology in the social sciences. New York, NY: Guilford. 
 
Bifulco, R., & Ladd, H. F. (2004). The impacts of charter schools on student 
achievement: Evidence from North Carolina (The Terry Sanford Institute of 
Public Policy: Duke, Working Paper Series SAN04-01).  Retrieved from 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED493385.pdf 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary. (2017). What is ULTRA VIRES?  Retrieved from 
http://thelawdictionary.org/ultra-vires/ 
 
Budde, R., (1988). Education by charter. Andover, MA: Regional Laboratory for the 
Northeast and Regional Islands.  Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED295298 
 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. (2017). Marshall (Mike) Smith: 
Senior fellow.  [Online web posting].  Retrieved from 
https://www.carnegiefoundation.org/who-we-are/staff-directory/mike-smith/ 
 
Carroll, J. B. (1963). A model of school learning. Teachers College Record 64(8), 722-
733. 
 
Catalanello, R. (2003, October 17). State officials vow to tighten leash on charter schools.  
St. Petersburg Times. p. 4B. 
 
Center for Research on Education Outcomes. (2013). National charter school study: 





Chion-Kennedy, L. (1998, November 17). School system to pitch charter school idea.  St. 
Petersburg Times, p. 3B. 
 
Chubb, T. E., & Moe, T. M.  (1990). Politics, markets, and America’s schools.  
Washington, DC: Brookings. 
 
Clark, M. A., Gleason, P. M., Tuttle, C. C., & Silverberg, M. K.  (2015). Do charter 
schools improve student achievement?  Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 37(4), 419-436. 
 
Coleman, J.  (1966). Equality of educational opportunity: Summary report.  Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
 
Congressional Digest. (1997). A framework for reform: Goals 2000: Educate America 




Conn, K. (2002). For-profit school management corporations: Serving the wrong master. 
Journal of Law & Education, 31, 129-148. 
 
Crew, R. E., Jr., & Anderson, M. R. (2003). Accountability and performance in charter 
schools in Florida: A theory-based evaluation. American Journal of Evaluation, 
24, 189-212.  
 
DiCarlo, M. (2011). The evidence on charter schools and test scores.  The Albert 
Shanker Institute.  Retrieved from http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED528633.pdf 
 
Editorial Projects in Education Research Center. (2011, September 19). Issues A-Z: No 
Child Left Behind. Education Week. Retrieved from 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/no-child-left-behind/ 
 
Egalite, A. J., & Kisida, B.  (2016). School size and student achievement: A longitudinal 
analysis. School Effectiveness and School Improvement 27(3), 406-417. 
 
Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1177/text 
 
Fabricant, M., & Fine, M. (2012). Charter schools and the corporate makeover of public 
education. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
 
Farrell, C., Wohlstetter, P., & Smith, J. (2012). Charter management organizations: An 
emerging approach to scaling up what works.  Educational Policy 26(4), 499-532. 
 
Finn, C. E. Jr., Manno, B. V., & Vanourek, G. (2000).  Charter schools in action: 
Renewing public education.  Princeton, NJ: University Press 
 116 
Finn, C. E. Jr.  (2008)  Troublemaker: A personal history of reform. Princeton, NJ: 
University Press. 
 
Finn, C. E. Jr., Manno, B. V., & Wright, B.L. (2016). Charter schools at the crossroads: 
Predicaments, paradoxes, possibilities.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education 
Press. 
 
Florida Department of Education. (2016a). Florida Standards Assessment 2015-16: 




Florida Department of Education (2016b). Florida Standards Assessment 2015-16: 




Florida Department of Education. (2016c). School public accountability reports 2015-




Florida Department of Education. (2016d). Charter School Directory.  Retrieved from 
http://app4.fldoe.org/CSA/PostToWeb/ManageSearch.aspx 
 
Florida Department of Education (2016e). Florida Standards Assessment 2015-16: 
Volume2 Test Development.  Tallahassee, FL: Author.  Retrieved from 
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/5663/urlt/V2FSA1516TechRpt.pdf 
 
Florida Department of Education (2016f).  Understanding Florida Standards Assessment 
Reports 2016. Tallahassee, FL: Author.  Retrieved from 
http://fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7490/urlt/UnderstandFSAReport16.pdf 
 
Florida Department of Education. (2017a). 2016-2017 School Accountability Reports: 
District Grades. Retrieved from http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org/ 
 
Florida Department of Education. (2017b). K-12 student assessment. Retrieved from 
http://www.fldoe.org/accountability/assessments/k-12-student-assessment 
 
Florida State University. (2017a). About CPALMS.  Retrieved from 
http://www.cpalms.org/CPALMS/about_us.aspx 
 









Fraenkel, J. R., Wallen, N. E., & Hyun, H. H.  (2015). How to design and evaluate 
research in education (9th ed.). New York, NY:McGraw-Hill. 
 
Garcia, D. R., Barber, R., & Molnar, A. (2009). Profiting from public education: 
Education management organizations and student achievement. Teachers College 
Record, 111(5), 1352-1379.  
 
Giersch, J.  (2014). Aiming for giants: Charter school legislation and the power of teacher 
unions.  Education and Urban Society, 46(6), 653-671. 
 
Hanushek, E. A., Kain, J. F., & Rivkin, S. G. (2001). Disruption versus tiebout 
improvement: The costs and benefits of switching schools. National Bureau of 
Economic Research (Working Paper 8479).  Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/papers/w8479.pdf 
 
Hassel, B. C., Terrell, M. G., & Kowal, J. (2006). Florida charter schools: Hot and 
humid with passing storms. Education Sector Reports. Retrieved from 
http://www.issuelab.org/resources/543/543.pdf 
 
Heaggans, R. C. (2006). Unpacking charter schools: A knapsack filled with a few broken 




Hiaasen, S., & McGrory, K. (2011, September 19). Florida charter schools: big money, 




Husband, T.,& Hunt, C.  (2015). A review of the empirical literature on No Child Left 





Imhotep-Nguzo Saba Charter School v. Department of Education, 947 So.2d 1279 (4th 





Jefferson County, Florida.  (2017).  About Jefferson County.  Retrieved from 
http://www.jeffersoncountyfl.gov/p/about-jefferson 
 
Jencks, C.  (1966).  Is the public school obsolete?  The Public Interest, 2 (Winter), 18-27. 
Johnson, J., Godwyll, F., & Shope, S. (2016).  The influence of grade span on student 
achievement in Florida: A quantitative investigation.  International Journal of 
Educational Reform, 25(4), 384-399. 
 
Joint Legislative Management Committee. (1996). General acts, resolutions and 
memorials adopted by the fourteenth legislature of Florida under the constitution 
revised in 1968 during the regular session, March 5, 1966, through May 4, 1966, 
Vol.1 Part 1, pp. 461-474.  Retrieved from 
http://edocs.dlis.state.fl.us/fldocs/leg/actsflorida/1996/1996v1pt1.pdf 
 
Kahlenberg, R. D., & Potter, H. (2015).  Restoring Shanker's vision for charter schools.  
American Educator, 38(4), 4-13. Retrieved from 
http://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/ae_winter2014.pdf 
 
Kelley, T. A. III.  (2015). North Carolina charter schools’ (Non-?) compliance with state 
and federal nonprofit law. North Carolina Law Review 96, 1757-1824. 
 
KIPP Foundation. (n.d.).  How is KIPP structured. Retrieved from 
http://www.kipp.org/schools/structure/ 
 
Kolderie, T., (2005).  Ray Budde and the origins of the charter concept.  Education 
Evolving.  Retrieved from http://www.educationevolving.org/pdf/Ray-Budde-
Origins-Of-Chartering.pdf 
 
Laws of Florida. (2002). Chapter 2002-387; Senate bill number 20-E.  Retrieved from 
http://laws.flrules.org/2002/387 
 
Ledger staff. (1997, March, 25). 18 charter schools to open in fall; three of the new 
charter schools to open in Polk. Lakeland Ledger, p. B3. 
 
Lee, V. E., & Loeb, S.  (2000). School size in Chicago elementary schools: Effects on 
teachers’ attitudes and students’ achievement. American Educational Research 
Journal 37(1), 3-31 
 
Legg, S.  (2017, June 5). Charter takeover of Jefferson County schools: Why?  League of 
Women Voters – Education Issues. Retrieved from 
http://www.wveducation.com/charter-takeover-of-jefferson-county-schools-why/ 
 
Levine, M., & Levine, A. (2012). ‘Left back’ and the age-grade system: Problem creation 
through problem solution.  American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 82(4), 455-462. 
 119 
Liu, E., (2015).  Solving the puzzle of charter schools: A new framework for 
understanding and improving charter school legislation and performance.  
Columbia Business Law Review (2015) 273-347. Retrieved from 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
Lockwood, A. T. (2004).  Charter schools decade. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow. 
López, F.  (2014).  Review of a meta-analysis of the literature on the effect of charter 
schools on student achievement.  National Education Policy Center.  Retrieved 
from http://nepc.colorado.edu/tjinktank/review-meta-analysis-effect-charter 
 
Loveless, T. (2003). Charter school achievement and accountability.  In P. E. Peterson & 
M. R. West (Eds.), No Child Left Behind: The politics and practice of school 
accountability (pp. 177-196).  Washington, DC: Brookings. 
 
MacGillis, A.  (2015, January 26). Testing time: Jeb Bush’s educational experiment.  
New Yorker Magazine.  Retrieved from 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/testing-time 
 
Martin, P. C.  (2015).  Contradictory reforms: When NCLB undermines charter school 
innovation. Current Issues in Education, 18(1), 1-12. 
 
May, J. J.  (2006). The charter school allure: Can traditional schools measure up?  
Education and Urban Society, 39(1), 19-45. 
 
Minnesota Department of Education.  (2017). Charter Schools.  Retrieved from 
http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/chart/ 
 
Miron, G., &Nelson, C.(2001). Student academic achievement in charter schools: What 
we know and why we know so little. (Occasional Paper No. 41). Columbia 





Molnar, A.  (2001). Calculating the benefits and costs of for-profit public education.  
Education Policy Analysis Archives, 9(15), 1-17. Retrieved from 
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/344/470 
 
Murphy, J., (2010).  The educator’s handbook for understanding and closing 
achievement gaps: Bringing achievement gaps into focus.  Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Corwin Press. 
 
Nathan, J. (1996a).  Possibilities, problems, and progress: Early lessons from the charter 
movement. Phi Delta Kappan, 78:1, 18-23. 
 
 120 
Nathan, J. (1996b). Charter schools: Creating hope and opportunity for American 
education.  San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. (2016). The health of the public charter 




National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. (2017). Charter School Data Dashboard.  
Retrieved from http://dashboard2.publiccharters.org/National/ 
 
National Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). A nation at risk: The 
imperative for educational reform. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
 
New Schools Venture Fund. (2017). Our history. Retrieved from 
http://newschools.org/about-us/our-history/ 
 
Nichols, S. L., Glass, G. V., & Berliner, D. C.  (2012). High stakes testing and student 
achievement: Updated analysis with NAEP data.  Education Policy Analysis 




No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301et seq.(2001).  Retrieved from 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/107-110.pdf 
 
Oberfield, Z. W.  (2016).  A bargain half fulfilled: Teacher autonomy and accountability 
in traditional public schools and public charter schools.  American Educational 
Research Journal 53(2), 296-323. 
 
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability [OPPAGA].  
(2005a).  Charter school application requirements are reasonable; Financial 
management problematic (Report number 05-11).  Retrieved from 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/0511rpt.pdf 
 
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability [OPPAGA].  
(2005b).  Charter school performance comparable to other public schools; 
stronger accountability needed (Report number 05-21).  Retrieved from 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/0521rpt.pdf 
 
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability [OPPAGA].  (2008). 
Steps taken to improve charter school financial management and performance 
accountability; additional action needed (Report number 0804).  Retrieved from 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/0804rpt.pdf 
 121 
Paino, M., Renzulli, L. A., Boylan, R. L., & Bradley, C. L. (2014). For grades or money? 
Charter school failure in North Carolina. Educational Administration Quarterly, 
50(3), 500-536. 
 
Payne, C., & Knowles, T.  (2009).  Promise and peril: Charter schools, urban school 
reform, and the Obama administration.  Harvard Educational Review, 79(2), 227-




Perkins-Gough, D.  (1997).  Charter schools: Whom do they serve, and how well?  ERS 
Spectrum 53(3), 3-9. 
 
Peterson, P. E., & Chingos, M. M.  (2009).  Impact of for-profit and nonprofit 
management on student achievement: The Philadelphia intervention, 2002-2008.  
(PEPG 09-02).  Retrieved from http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED504449.pdf 
 
Quinn, R., Oelberger, C. R., & Meyerson, D. (2016). Getting- to scale: Opportunities, and 
resources in the early diffusion of the charter management organization, 1999-
2006.  Teachers College Record, 118(090303), 1-44. 
 
Rado, D. (1995, May 7). In the end, education reform didn’t pass. St. Petersburg Times, 
p. 1B. 
 
Rado, D. (1995, May 12). Agency says charter schools still possible.  St. Petersburg 
Times, p. 5B. 
 
Rado, D. (1996, May 5).  Legislature chalks up school bills.  St. Petersburg Times, p. 1B. 
Rado, D. (1998, March 18).  Charter schools may expand.  St. Petersburg Times, p. 1B. 
Radu, L. (2012).  The Goals 2000 educate America act and the national standards in 
education.  Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov, Series VII, 5(54) 
No. 2, 21-24. 
 
Ravitch, D.  (2008).  A nation still at risk. Hoover Digest, 2008(4), n.p.  Retrieved from 
http://www.hoover.org/research/nation-still-risk. 
 
Revamping of Education Governance in Florida Reveals a New Political Order. (2002).  







Roch, C. H., & Sai, N. (2015). Nonprofit, for-profit, or stand-alone?  How management 
organizations influence the working conditions in charter schools.  Social Science 
Quarterly 96(5), 1380-1395). 
 
Rollwagen, J., &McLellan, D. (1988). Citizens League report: Chartered schools = 




Sass, T. R. (2006). Charter schools and student achievement in Florida. Education 
Finance and Policy, 1(1), 91-122. 
 
School Board of Hillsborough County v. Tampa School Development Corp 113 So.3d 




School Board of Volusia County v. Academies of Excellence, Inc. 974 So. 2d 1186 (5th  




Schroeder, J. (2004).  Ripples of innovation: Charter schooling in Minnesota, the 
nation’s first charter school state. Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute.  
Retrieved from http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED491210.pdf 
 
Silverman, R. M. (2012).  Making waves or treading water? An analysis of charter 
schools in New York State.  Urban Education, 48(2), 257-288. 
 
St. Petersburg Times. (2002, March 31). Rewriting the code, p. 2D. 
Steinberg, W. J. (2011).  Statistics alive! (2nd. ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. 




Stillings, C. (2005). Charter schools and No Child -Left Behind: Sacrificing autonomy 




Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1989). Using multivariate statistics (2nd ed.). New 
York: Harper & Row. 
 
 123 
Tan, X., & Michel, R. (2011, September). Why do standardized testing programs report 
scale scores? Why not just the raw or percent correct scores?  R & D Connections 
16.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/RD_Connections16.pdf 
 
Toson, A. L.-M. (2011). Show me the money: The benefits of for-profit charter schools 
(aka EMOs). Education and Urban Society, 45(6), 658-667. 
 
U.S. Department of Education.  (1995). The improving America’s schools act of 1994.  
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED399649.pdf 
 
U.S. Department of Education.  (2002). The no child left behind act of 2001 [Executive 
Summary].  Retrieved from 
https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.pdf 
 
U.S. Department of Education. (n.d.).  Marshall S. Smith [Online web posting].  
Retrieved from https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/smith.html 
 
Vinovskis, M. A. (2009). From A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind: National 
education goals and the creation of federal education policy.  New York, NY: 
Teachers College Press. 
 
Wallsten, P. (1998, May 23).  Chiles bends on charter schools.  St. Petersburg Times, p. 
1B. 
 
White, G. W., Stepney, C. T., Hatchimonji, D. R., Moceri, D. C., Linsky, A. V., Reyes-
Portillo, J. A., Ekias, M. J. (2016). The increasing impact of socioeconomics and 
race on standardized academic test scores across elementary, middle, and high 
school.  American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 86(1) 10-23. 
 
Wildt, A. R., & Ahtola, O. (1978). Quantitative applications in the social sciences: 
Analysis of covariance.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Wilson, S. F., Levin, H., & Mathews, J.  (2005). Realizing the promise of brand-name 
schools.  Brookings Papers on Educational Policy, 8, 89-135. 
 
Wong, K. K. & Langevin, W. E. (2007).  Policy expansion of school choice in the  
American states. Peabody Journal of Education, 82:2-3, 440-472. 
 
Zimmer, R., Gill, B., Booker, K., Lavertu, S., & Witte, J. (2012). Examining charter 
student achievement effects across seven states. Economics of Education Review, 
31(2), 213-224.  
 
 
